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Abstract
Data from aircraft accidents and line observation studies indicate that inadequate pilot
monitoring is a growing safety concern. In the cockpit environment, pilots who fail to properly
manage their workload commit more monitoring errors. Given the lack of training and
educational programs available to pilots which emphasize improving their monitoring skills,
more research is needed to assess the usefulness of types of training that can be used to improve
pilots’ monitoring. This research project sets out to determine if the potential exists to enhance
pilots’ monitoring skills through online training. For this study, 40 military helicopter pilots
(participants) were divided into two training groups: (1) an online training group, which
completed a 20-minute web-based training module, and (2) a control group, which read a 20minute article on aviation safety. Within each group, the pilots were paired and completed two
training events in a flight simulator as part of their normal duties. The effects of the training
were evaluated using Kirkpatrick’s multi-level framework: reactions, learning, behaviors, and
results. First, all pilots receiving training were surveyed to capture the trainees’ perceptions of
satisfaction and utility of the training. Second, all pilots were given a multiple-choice test to
assess the effect the training had on learners’ knowledge of the training objectives. Next, the
researchers observed, via video recording, both groups’ behaviors during flight simulator events.
The researchers recorded occurrences of four behavior markers as the crews flew multiple
instrument approaches. The researchers used two of these markers to study transfer of training
and two markers to examine positive vs. negative outcomes at critical tasks during the simulated
flights. The results show positive changes in the reactions, learning, and behavior dimensions,
lending support to the effectiveness of relatively inexpensive online training to teach monitoring
skills.
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Introduction
In a typical two-pilot aircrew, the flying pilot’s (PF) primary responsibility is to control
the aircraft by physically manipulating the flight controls. The other pilot, referred to as the pilot
not flying (PNF), conducts supporting responsibilities including navigation, communication,
checklists, and monitoring the actions of the flying pilot (Tullo, 2010). These in-flight
responsibilities are not indicative of authority (i.e., who is designated as the “captain” or “pilot in
charge”) as the PF and PNF roles may be alternated throughout the flight as needed (Dismukes &
Berman, 2010; Prince, Salas, Brannick, & Prince, 2010). Recently, there has been a paradigm
shift within the aviation industry regarding the role of the PNF. Particularly in the airlines, the
preferred term for this role has changed from non-flying pilot into monitoring pilot (PM) to
impress upon flight crews that (a) monitoring is the PNF’s primary responsibility, and (b) the
PNF has an active responsibility to detect errors in the PF’s performance (Sumwalt, Thomas, &
Dismukes, 2002; Orlady, 2010). Improving the PNF’s performance in the monitoring role is the
focus of this study.
Aircrew Monitoring
Data from accident reports and flight operation audits all confirm that errors in
monitoring and cross-checking can be highly consequential. For example, a National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) study found 84 percent of crew-caused air carrier accidents
in the U.S. could be attributed to inadequate crew monitoring or challenging (NTSB, 1994). A
Flight Safety Foundation Approach and Landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) study of 76
approach and landing accidents worldwide found that 63 percent were attributable to “poor
monitoring and cross-checking” (Khatwa & Helmreich, 1998). Accident reports also indicate
that breakdowns in monitoring are a factor in half of all controlled flight into terrain accidents
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(International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO], 1994). In 2010, the NTSB issued a safety
recommendation (A-07-13) in response to the February 2009 Colgan Air Flight 3407 crash near
Buffalo, NY. The two-pilot aircrew inadvertently allowed the aircraft to decelerate into an
unrecoverable stall during an approach and subsequently crashed killing all 49 persons on board
(NTSB, 2010). The NTSB recommendation required that “all pilot training programs be
modified to contain modules that teach and emphasize monitoring skills and workload
management and include opportunities to practice and demonstrate proficiency in these areas”
(NTSB, 2010, p. 59). This was the second time a NTSB report from a multiple-fatality accident
referred to this recommendation (NTSB, 2007; NTSB, 2010). The NTSB investigation of a 2005
crash of a Cessna Citation 560 in Pueblo, Colorado, had many similarities to that of Colgan Air
Flight 3407. While conducting an instrument approach, the aircraft began to accumulate ice on
its wings. The pilots initiated an airspeed adjustment as they began to diagnose the severity of
the icing and decide on a course of action. Meanwhile, the pilots unknowingly allowed the
aircraft to decelerate beyond safe airspeed limits into a stalled condition, crashing about four
miles short of the runway (NTSB, 2007).
These reports and others have, in part, prompted several airlines to change their standard
operating procedures (SOPs) to acknowledge monitoring as a primary and shared responsibility
of both crewmembers (Sumwalt et al., 2002; Dismukes & Berman, 2010; Tullo, 2010). In 2003,
the FAA published an advisory circular titled “Standard Operating Procedures for Flight Deck
Crewmembers” with the aforementioned recommendation to aircraft operators to change the
term “non flying pilot” in their SOPs to “monitoring pilot” due to government and industry
preference (Federal Aviation Administration, 2003, p. 1). Further, the FAA (2004a) reinforced a
similar sentiment in writing that:
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Effective monitoring and cross-checking can be the last line of defense that prevents an
accident because detecting an error or unsafe situation may break the chain of events
leading to an accident. This monitoring function is always essential, and particularly so
during approach and landing when controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) accidents are most
common. (p. 14)
As Sumwalt (1999) explains, monitoring the situation within the cockpit environment is
the first step towards recognizing deviations, which leads to challenging potential errors and
ultimately increasing safety margins.
Psychology of Monitoring
Monitoring is a paradigm rooted in human cognition. Monitoring is defined as “to watch,
keep track of, or check usually for a special purpose” according to www.merriam-webster.com
(January 12, 2010). In aviation terms, monitoring refers to the “responsibility of pilots to keep
track of the aircraft’s position, course, and configuration; the status of the aircraft’s systems and
the actions of the other pilots in the cockpit” (Dismukes & Berman, 2010, p. 7). Sumwalt,
Morrison, Watson, and Taube (1997) defined monitoring error as:
A failure to adequately watch, observe, keep track of, or cross check any or all of the
following: (1) the aircraft’s trajectory, i.e., taxi and flight path, speed management,
navigation; (2) automation systems and mode status, i.e., flight management system
(FMS) entries, mode control panel (MCP) settings/ selections, awareness of automation
mode; and (3) aircraft systems and components, i.e., fuel quantity, aircraft configuration,
system status. (p. 1)
Monitoring then, by definition, requires pilots to pay attention to multiple concurrent
tasks which, in turn, make them susceptible to errors simply because humans lack an infinite

4

capability to manage large quantities of tasks. Research indicates these errors are most
commonly experienced in terms of one forgetting to perform an intended task (i.e., making an
error of omission) (Sarter & Alexander, 2000; Dismukes, Loukopoulos, & Jobe, 2001;
Dismukes, 2007). For a pilot to monitor both the aircraft and other crew members’ actions they
must mentally sort an assortment of tasks through a process known as interleaving. This process
creates smaller cognitive tasks (mental placeholders) just to keep the progress of the tasks
organized and then to later retrieve them, which leaves pilots increasingly vulnerable to making
these types of errors (Loukopoulos, Dismukes, & Barshi, 2009). One study examined NASA’s
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database to analyze self-reported safety incidents that
occurred as a result of concurrent task demands for the crew’s attention (Dismukes, Young, &
Sumwalt, 1998). The study found that 69 percent of the mishandled activities involved a
shortcoming in some type of monitoring responsibility (Dismukes et al., 1998). Further, the
researchers surveyed a sample of pilots to identify existing techniques the pilots used to manage
concurrent tasks and reduce their personal vulnerability to monitoring lapses. The techniques the
participants suggested were consistent with a human cognition-based perspective – techniques
such as “creating salient reminder cues, breaking concurrent tasks into subtasks, and identifying
specific things to monitor” were the most common responses (Dismukes et al., 2001, p. 2). In a
broader context, a study by Brandimonte and Passolunghi (1994) found that cues serving to
remind individuals to complete a deferred task are more effective when (a) they are conspicuous,
(b) they are strongly associated with the deferred task, and (c) they are positioned in a way the
individual is likely to notice them at the appropriate time. Loukopoulos et al. (2009) explain the
strategy for making these mental reminders is like that of creating a mental “sticky note” (p.
125).
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The discussion of concurrent tasks reflects the profound influence of workload on
monitoring performance (NTSB, 2010). Although definitions vary, workload refers to the
mental and physical task demands on an individual at a particular time – a load that varies based
on the environment, experience, and mental state of the crew member (Wickens, Gordon, & Liu,
2004; Orlady & Orlady, 1999). Studies in human performance have indicated that humans do
not perform optimally under either extremely high or low workload conditions. Under low
levels of workload, crews’ vigilance tends to decrease and, especially if complacency sets in,
performance deteriorates. The concern here is that monitoring a complex system for low
frequency events for long periods of time requires a significant amount of vigilance, while other,
less critical task demands in the cockpit may be providing pilots more salient cues (such as 3-D
moving map displays). Dismukes and Berman (2010) explain that “humans are inherently poor
at monitoring for infrequent events” (p. 24). By comparison, under high levels of workload,
aircrew performance losses are also likely, but for different reasons. These situations force
crews to prioritize tasks and diminish their cognitive resources available for other tasks like
monitoring (Thomas & Petrilli, 2006). High workload situations often tunnel the attention of the
PNF towards other tasks (Kontogiannis & Malakis, 2009). High workload conditions, such as
the pre-takeoff taxi, and the approach-to-landing phase of flight, are generally where pilots make
consequential monitoring errors (NTSB, 1994; Sumwalt et al., 1997; Sumwalt, 1999). Several
commercial aviation landing accidents have occurred after the non-flying pilots failed to
challenge or abort dangerous approaches under high workloads despite cockpit indications that
strongly suggested such a course of action (Dismukes, Berman, & Loukopoulos, 2007).
Human factors research has contributed to our understanding of monitoring performance
mainly in the context of pilots’ reliability in detecting and managing errors in the cockpit
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(Sumwalt, 1999; Sumwalt et al., 2002; Thomas, 2005). Sumwalt (1999) explained that effective
monitoring is the first step towards recognizing deviations (i.e., errors), which in turn leads to
pilots’ challenging them and ultimately increasing safety margins in flight deck environments.
An observational study of line operations in a simulator found that even experienced aircrews
fail to catch nearly half of all errors committed in the cockpit, and went on to identify “vigilance”
and “monitoring and cross-check” as the top two (of twelve) non-technical performance markers
indicating whether threats and errors were effectively managed by the aircrews (Thomas, 2004).
Vigilance and attention are key components of monitoring (Tullo, 2010) and have been identified
as significant predictors of effective error management in flight operations, particularly during
the vertical phases of flight (Thomas, 2004). Although the terms monitoring and vigilance are
sometimes used interchangeably, they do have differences. Vigilance tasks generally refer to
tasks that monitor exclusively for specific targets or deviations and require that the task is kept in
the conscious, short-term memory for quicker retrieval (Brandimonte, Ferrante, Feresin, &
Delbello, 2001; Guynn, 2008). Monitoring, in contrast, is the process of sharing cognitive
resources between various types of tasks, including but not entirely focused on target detection
tasks (Guynn, 2008). This suggests that monitoring is a better description of the larger mental
processes (e.g., flying, system cross-checks, and navigation) often required of pilots in the
cockpit environment.
The term “threat and error management” rose to prominence within aviation safety
vernacular in the late 1990s as a result of extensive line operations studies into team performance
and crew resource management behaviors as part of the University of Texas’ Human Factors
Research Project (Helmreich, Klinect, & Wilhelm, 1999). This research greatly advanced the
notion that non-technical skill training is needed to help trap errors that infiltrate the cockpit or
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flight deck environment (Sumwalt, 1999). Non-technical skills are defined as “the cognitive and
social skills of flight crew members in the cockpit, not directly related to aircraft control, system
management, and standard operating procedures” (Flin et al., 2003, p. 96). Among these nontechnical skills, monitoring is considered a skill central to successful error management
(Sumwalt, 1999; Sumwalt et al., 2002; Thomas, 2005; Dismukes & Berman, 2010). Thomas
(2005) described monitoring as a group of cognitive skill dimensions “concerned with constantly
watching and scrutinizing the operating state of the system” to manage errors (p. 19). The first
of the skill dimensions is self-monitoring, which describes the metacognitive process of
“maintaining an awareness of one’s own state” (Thomas, 2005, p. 19). This includes the ability
to detect degradation in one’s own performance, such as is the case when one is overtasked or
distracted. The second monitoring skill dimension Thomas describes is “scan and check”, a
skill requiring conscious analysis of the status of the system. In the flight environment, scan and
check requires special vigilance, as monitoring for a low-frequency, low-signal-to-noise ratio
type of event is tedious. Many factors, including experience and planning, factor into how
successful or vigilant the person is at scan and check performance. According to Thomas, the
third dimension, divergence detection, is simply the act of identifying deviations from the plan
within the system. This aspect of monitoring is dependent on one’s mental model and how the
real, current situation is compared against the ideal models. The success of monitoring is
directly proportional to one’s attention and vigilance, and plays into an individual’s overall
situation awareness (SA).
The link between monitoring and situation awareness is expressed throughout research
(Endsley, 1995; Jones & Endsley, 1995; Thomas, 2005; Fioratou, Flin, Glavin, & Patey, 2010).
Situation awareness consists of three levels, (a) perceiving elements within the environment, (b)
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comprehending their meaning, and (c) projecting their status in the near future (Endsley, 1988).
Jones and Endsley (1995) developed and applied a “situation awareness error taxonomy” to
identify causal factors leading to SA errors in the cockpit. The most frequent error causal factor
was a “failure to monitor” which accounted for 37 percent of the errors. Failure to monitor was
categorized as a Level 1 SA (i.e., perception) error and was defined as an instance when the
information was directly available to the pilots, but for various reasons, was not observed or
included in the crew member’s scan pattern (Endsley, 1995). Level 2 SA is important as it
describes the role that experience and mental models have on monitoring performance. Given
the large and complex amount of data that a pilot must monitor for potential changes, one’s
ability to detect a potential error is directly related to how developed and advanced their mental
model is (Kontogiannis & Malakis, 2009). A highly developed mental model defines an
individual’s expectations in terms of how quickly they match what they are seeing with what
they expect to see (Endsley, 1995). This research suggests flight experience should improve a
pilot’s monitoring skills.
The use of “prospective memory” is another cognitive performance dimension which
impacts aircrew monitoring. Prospective memory refers to a person’s ability to perform an
intended action at an appropriate moment in the future without a direct reminder to do so (Ellis,
1996). For example, when an air traffic controller tells a pilot to descend to a certain altitude, the
pilot immediately starts the descent, but must use prospective memory processes to retrieve the
required action (leveling off) at the appropriate time (upon reaching the appropriate altitude).
Prospective memory tasks are generally either event-based or time-based, referring to which
criterion is used as a mental cue or reference to retrieve the prospective task from memory at the
right time. Generally speaking, the more a sequence is practiced and the more salient the

9

environmental cues, the better humans are at performing the prospective memory task (Ellis,
1996). Prospective memory theories allow researchers to explain and evaluate the outcome of
deferred, yet intended actions. As another example, pilots must routinely complete a landing
checklist to ensure the aircraft is configured properly for landing – e.g., landing gear is down and
wing flaps are extended. Since this task is highly practiced and reliable, it is referred to as a
habitual task (Dismukes, 2007). The aircraft itself also provides cues, like warning horns, to
remind pilots to complete the landing checks prior to landing, and the system is generally very
effective. If, instead, the pilots intentionally decided to delay a step of the landing checklist, e.g.,
keep the landing gear and flaps up to enable a faster speed on approach to stay ahead of an
approaching thunderstorm, the delayed task would become an episodic prospective task.
Compared to a habitual task, humans are much more prone to forget an episodic task (Dismukes,
2007). Key to this discussion of prospective memory is the understanding that at any particular
time, pilot errors are largely a function of the interplay between the concurrent tasks associated
with managing the flight (radios, configuring the aircraft, etc.) and the encoding, storage, and
retrieving (prospective memory) processes the tasks inevitably produce.
To elaborate an application of prospective memory a bit further, federal regulations and
air traffic control (ATC) operating procedures are designed to ensure aircraft are efficiently and
safely routed from departure to destination. Pilots begin the flight by gaining a very specific
clearance (i.e., flight path “routing” guidance via expected airways and altitudes to fly) from an
ATC dispatcher, but then have to be responsive to any changes that amend this original plan
from that point forward. ATC may amend these directions periodically in the form of new
altitudes, airspeeds, or headings. Changes are especially difficult and critical for pilots to
effectively manage during periods of high workload. For example, as an aircraft nears its
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destination airport, the pilots expect to adhere to a published flight path procedure called an
instrument approach procedure (IAP). IAPs contain precise directions with regard to altitudes
and headings and a printed copy of these directions is kept in the aircraft’s cockpit. As an
aircraft nears the airport, the air traffic controller will usually provide a course and altitude and
an approach clearance, such as, “[aircraft call sign], descend to 3,000 [altitude], fly heading 180
[degrees], cleared for the ILS [type] approach to runway 22.” This creates several prospective
memory tasks for the aircrew. First, they start the “turn-to-heading” assignment, with the
prospective memory task to stop the turn when heading gauge reads 180 degrees (i.e., south).
Second, they must start a descent with the prospective task to level off at 3,000 feet above mean
sea level. Third, they must refer to the “ILS runway 22” published approach procedure, which
assigns headings and altitude requirements to complete a safe descent to the airport. This
procedure can be fairly simple or complex based on the airport’s instrument approach procedure
itself. During these tasks, the increased prospective memory tasks contribute to an increased
probability of making an error. Consequently, there is an increased dependence on the nonflying pilot to back up the flying pilot.
Standard Operating Procedures
Checklists, SOPs, and flight manual guidance are among the best tools aircrews currently
have in the multi-pilot cockpit to prevent errors of omission, as they promote cross-checking and
monitoring certain tasks at the most appropriate times to prevent the most likely errors of
omission (Dismukes & Berman, 2010). One example of how airlines accomplish this is by
specifying acceptable ranges for flightpath deviations during approaches – a phase of flight
particularly susceptible to errors (Loukopoulos et al., 2009). Nonetheless, an in-depth analysis
of flight operations manuals and SOPs at two major airlines found that these publications
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described monitoring duties with insufficient guidance – particularly in terms of how frequently
to check the status of the various items and how to appropriately divide attention between
monitoring and other tasks performed simultaneously (Loukopoulos et al., 2009).
Leaders and managers are responsible to develop well-thought-out SOPs, by making
monitoring guidance explicit in the way flight checklists and other flight procedures are written
specific to each company and aircraft type (Sumwalt et al., 2002). In theory, the earlier
deviations in altitude, heading, airspeed, or other systems are detected by the crew, the less likely
the results will be consequential. Recently, researchers have leveraged explicit monitoring
guidance in SOPs as an opportunity to measure the frequency of monitoring deviations using
observational techniques. For example, during busy flight sequences like climbouts and
approaches, PNFs are required to callout “1,000 feet to go” in advance of arriving at the target
altitude (Loukopoulos et al., 2009; Dismukes & Berman, 2010). These types of procedures rely
upon prospective memory tasks and are consequently more prone to error. One line observation
study found that of the six to seven monitoring deviations aircrews make on average during a
flight, late or omitted callouts (i.e., mandatory ones) account for over half of all monitoring
deviations (Dismukes & Berman, 2010). Other, expected-but-voluntary pilot monitoring
responsibilities include speaking up when a system malfunctions, ensuring controller directions
are followed and challenging flight path deviations deemed outside a “normal” range.
Organizations are increasingly making these normal ranges explicit, but standardizing is tricky as
allowable deviations largely depend on the flight regime. An example of this would be a recent
change in SOPs to mandate the PNF to call for a mandatory wave off if, at 500 feet above
ground, the aircraft’s flight path met certain “unstabilized” approach criteria (e.g., too steep or
too fast; Sumwalt et al., 1999; Dismukes et al., 2007; Dismukes & Berman, 2010).
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Phase of Flight
Klinect, Wilhelm, and Helmreich’s (1999) study of one airline’s line operations identified
that the “descent/approach/landing” phase contained the most aircrew errors and these errors
tended to result in the most consequential outcomes. In another study accounting for 300
observations of line operations to capture various behavioral markers associated with threat and
error management in the aircraft, Dismukes and Berman (2010) found that monitoring deviations
(defined as omitted or late callouts, omitted verification, or not monitoring aircraft state or
position) occurred most frequently during the climb (41.9 percent) and descent (26.5 percent)
phases of flight. Both sets of data were consistent with a 1997 review of the NASA’s ASRS
database of incident reports which found 75 percent of monitoring errors took place during
climbing, descending, or approach phases (Sumwalt et al., 1997). In fact, Sumwalt and
colleagues (2002) compiled a diagram giving a profile view of a typical flight from the point of
departure to its destination. Certain phases of flight are depicted in yellow indicating these are
considered “areas of vulnerability” (p. 181, see Figure 1). The areas of vulnerability include
taxi-out, climbout below 10,000 feet, transition altitude (i.e., the cockpit adjustment from
referencing sea level altitude to flight level altitudes), within 1,000 feet of level off, the cruisedescent transition, descent, approach, and landing, and taxi-in (Sumwalt et al., 2002). There are
several aviation safety implications of the research-based findings which link consequential
monitoring errors and vertical phases of flight. The first is the understanding that these areas
impose the greatest workload on aircrews, so the aircrews are most error-prone during these
phases of flight. The second is the idea that errors committed in these regimes have fewer
defenses in place to trap them, which means that monitoring is, in some cases, the last defense
preventing a consequential outcome or one in which flight safety is compromised (Sumwalt et
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al., 2002). The third takeaway is that AOV awareness should be incorporated into aviation
education programs and lectures. In response to the frequency and criticality of these AOVrelated errors, the vertical phase of flight will be the primary focus of monitoring performance in
this study.

Figure 1. Sumwalt et al.’s (2002) Areas of Vulnerability in Commercial Aviation
Monitoring and Assertiveness
Crew resource management (CRM) has grown to become the premier human factors-skill
training program for airlines, military, and most other aviation organizations (Kearns, 2010).
CRM is used to minimize human error by teaching aircrews cognitive and social skills to
improve their behaviors related to: decision-making, crew coordination, leadership, effective
communications, risk management, situation awareness, and others (Salas, Wilson, Burke, &
Wightman, 2006; Tullo, 2010). CRM training is usually classroom-based training, but in recent
years there have been a few examples of computer-based CRM training formats (Kearns, 2009).
As the content, instructor qualifications, and method of delivery for CRM training is highly
variable across organizations and types of operation, this has made it very difficult to draw
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conclusions regarding the effectiveness of CRM at the industry-wide level (Salas, Burke,
Bowers, & Wilson, 2001).
One discussion in many CRM training programs emphasizes that pilots to be both
vigilant and assertive, i.e., sustain one’s attention and, regardless of rank or experience, be
prepared to quickly “speak up” when unsafe flight conditions arise (Orasanu, Murray, Rodvold,
& Tyzzer, 1999; Salas et al., 2006). The better CRM programs go further and provide junior
pilots some examples of professional, non-confrontational methods to challenge authority in the
flight environment should the need arise. Assertiveness is relevant because many apparent
“monitoring” errors, as identified in mishaps, can actually be instances of poorly-applied
assertiveness, e.g., the non-flying pilot saw something wrong but did not speak up because of
professional courtesy or latent fears of repercussions (Jentsch, Martin, & Bowers, 1997). Studies
on the role assertiveness plays in the multi-pilot cockpit provide insight into some of the
individual pilot differences associated with our understanding of monitoring performance. For
one, there is mounting evidence that errors committed by pilots-in-command are less likely to be
caught and checked by the co-pilots than vice versa (Jentsch et al., 1997; Jentsch, Barnett,
Bowers, & Salas, 1999; Sumwalt et al., 2002). In fact, 81 percent of commercial accidents from
1978 to 1990 occurred with the captain at the flight controls and similarly, 79 percent of
accidents from 1991 to 2001 occurred with the captain at the controls (NTSB, 1994; Dismukes et
al., 2007). This is consistent with research by Kontogiannis and Malakis (2009) that suggested
that less experienced pilots would have less advanced mental models and therefore may function
as less reliable monitors. However, combining these two NTSB studies and excluding specific
cases where the captain rapidly took the controls from the first officer just prior to the accident,
the percent of the time the captain was at the flight controls drops to 66, which is not
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significantly greater than if this factor were random (Dismukes et al., 2007, p. 284). Helmreich
and Foushee (1993) suggest that the less experienced pilots commit more monitoring errors
because these pilots are (a) more error prone because of their inexperience, and (b) more hesitant
to be assertive with a more senior pilot as they fear it will create additional tension between the
pilots. Another study exploring these causes (Jentsch et al., 1997) identified three mutually
exclusive explanations for why junior pilot fail at monitoring tasks. First, the junior pilots were
not managing their workload well, and did not detect the errors. Second, in many cases the
junior pilots were detecting the errors, but were not speaking up as they were not recognizing the
problem required attention. Finally, similar to the Helmreich and Foushee (1993) finding, the
junior pilots were sometimes afraid to speak up because of the expected negative consequences
in terms of the senior pilot’s reaction (see discussion in Besco, 1995; Jentsch et al., 1997). In
summary, while the data does point toward increased pilot experience contributing to effective
monitoring, this data tends to come from relatively small samples of accident data showing lessexperienced pilots (who tend to be less assertive) not intervening in time to prevent an incident.
This means that conclusive evidence whether pilots develop into better monitors with more flight
experience is still lacking.
The continuing need to train pilots to assertively challenge in-flight inconsistencies is
well documented in aviation research (Jentsch et al., 1997; Orasanu et al., 1999; Fischer &
Orasanu, 2000; Dismukes & Berman, 2010). This training plays an important role particularly in
ensuring that junior and less-experienced pilots are active participants and do not allow
something bad to happen that they may have seen coming because they were afraid to speak up
to a more experienced pilot. One such structured intervention is the P.A.C.E. (i.e., probe, alert,
challenge, and emergency model; Besco, 1995). Other organizations (e.g., Flight Safety
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Foundation and Department of Defense) have institutionalized other methods for intra-cockpit
challenges, methods such as the “two-challenge rule” (Lindblom, 2007; Flight Safety
Foundation, 2010). The problem, however, is that like the Jentsch et al. (1997) study found, the
assertiveness role is contingent upon pilots first detecting these unsafe flight conditions. There is
still a shortcoming in CRM curricula providing explicit guidance or training on how pilots can
more effectively monitor, and therefore detect, these deviations or potentially unsafe conditions
(Khatwa & Helmreich, 1998; Sumwalt & Lemos, 2010). On one hand, pilots are expected to
have the technical proficiency to detect any and all errors and deviations, but on the other hand,
they may not fully understand their performance limitations as they pertain to this skill. Sumwalt
(1999) explained:
CRM courses deal with improving the ability of crewmembers to challenge others when a
situation appears unsafe or unwise, many of these courses provide little explicit guidance
on how to improve monitoring. We feel that carefully developed procedures and
guidelines to enhance flight-crew monitoring can make a significant contribution toward
improving aviation safety. (p. 2)
This is not to suggest that simply having organizations add a CRM module on the subject
of monitoring is the best solution – at this moment, not enough is known in order to speculate on
the best method to train monitoring skills (e.g., classroom, simulation, etc.; Sumwalt, 1999).
While research has identified a few effective methods for training some categories of CRM skills
such as teamwork (Brannick, Prince, & Salas, 2005), there is no empirical research specifically
evaluating training programs (or parts of programs) targeted at improving pilots’ monitoring
skills. Guidance for more effectively designing such training, however, is relatively abundant
(Dismukes & Berman, 2010; Sumwalt et al., 2002; Thomas, 2004; Flight Safety Foundation,
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2010). Dismukes and Berman (2010) suggest CRM training should include a module training
pilots to counter their vulnerability to committing monitoring errors through practical techniques,
e.g., “be slow and deliberate” and “respect human cognitive limitations” (p. 32). According to
one aviation safety professional, training directed at improving pilots’ monitoring skills needs to
be more interactive and engaging: “good monitoring skills are not inherent in pilots as they
progress…effective monitoring techniques must be trained and rewarded” (Tullo, 2001, p. 106).
Evaluating Monitoring Performance
Any evaluation of a crew’s monitoring performance requires a distinction between the
duties of the pilot flying (PF) and the pilot not flying (PNF) within the flight deck environment.
The flying pilot’s primary responsibility, from the moment the aircraft begins to taxi, assumes a
high level of active and conscious monitoring, particularly of the aircraft’s flight path or
trajectory. For the PF, flight training and experience promote a mindset which suggests
monitoring the primary flight instruments (i.e., altitude, airspeed, heading, vertical speed, and
turn needle) is the most important factor within his or her overall responsibilities. Still, the PF’s
job requires vigilance to counter complacency during low workload periods, and channeled
attention to effectively manage concurrent tasks during periods of high workload (Jentsch et al.,
1999). Data indicates that the workload involved with actually flying the aircraft can certainly
reach a point that peripheral situation cues are likely to be missed (Jentsch et al., 1999). Since
monitoring skills involve having to divide attention between keeping track of several aspects of
the aircraft and what the other pilot is doing, the most important skill any pilot possesses is
knowing where to focus his or her attention, i.e., awareness of what the most important things to
monitor within their environment are. One early finding from simulator studies of cockpit
management (CRM) was that the PFs may not be as vigilant monitoring the right equipment
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when automation is being used. As Sarter, Mumaw, and Wickens (2007) reported, “monitoring
failures constitute a major contributor to breakdowns in pilot-automation interaction” (p. 355).
Studies examining the limits of pilots’ cognitive abilities suggest that in multi-crew
aircraft, the PNF’s level of active monitoring and cross-checking is critical to flight safety. As
previously mentioned, the PNF is the pilot responsible for normal radio communications,
navigation, and checklist duties. Observational research has in fact shown that the PNF actually
has better overall situation awareness than the PF during critical phases of the flight (Jentsch et
al., 1999; Thomas, 2005). This does not necessarily imply that the PNF has a less active job, but
instead that the PNF is in a better overall position to allocate mental resources to manage and
monitor the bigger picture, such as to catch a subtle change in a weather report or a
miscommunication over the radio. During much of the flight, the PNF focuses attention on
several tasks that take priority over the concurrent responsibility to monitor the actions of the
other pilot. However, during the final few minutes of an approach, the PNF would have
completed most navigation and communication tasks and should be actively involved in
sustained monitoring and backing up the actions of the flying pilot. This is particularly
important as it demonstrates that the PNF, with the benefit of their reduced workload during the
approach, is in an excellent position to monitor the flight path, the flying pilot’s actions, and to
serve as the final defense against any other threats and errors. The in-flight monitoring
performance of the PNF is of particular interest to this study.
Training Pilots to Monitor
Developing on the idea that little research has tapped into the development of specific
non-technical aviation skills (O'Connor, Hörmann, Flin, Lodge, Goeters, the JARTEL Group,
2002), this research intends to produce a literature-driven approach to the design, development,
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implementation, and evaluation of a cognitive skill training program focused on aircrew
monitoring. An effective training program is built on learning theory and lessons learned from
previous designs. Learning is defined as “a relatively permanent change in human capabilities
that is not a result of growth processes” (Noe, 2004, p. 107). Three learning theories in
particular play a role in how pilots learn and each has a direct application to the design of future
monitoring skill training programs. First, information processing theory is important because it
describes a specific arrangement of internal processes (e.g. perceiving, storage, and feedback)
that are a part of trainees’ ability to learn and retain information they have been taught. Within
this model, feedback is emphasized as a critical factor which reinforces behaviors that are
appropriate to store in the long-term memory (Noe, 2004). Sumwalt et al. (2002) specifically
expressed the importance of feedback with respect to training pilots to be better monitoring
pilots. Second, the cognitive load theory (CLT) builds on the processes as described by the
information processing theory (Kearns, 2010). The CLT is based on the premise that a person
learns through an interactive process in which active “chunks” of information in the limitedcapacity working memory (WM, or short-term memory) become stored in the long-term memory
based on the amount of rehearsal, elaboration, and practice they are given. Learning occurs at
the moment the information gets stored in the long-term memory (Wickens, Gordon, & Liu,
2004). The CLT focuses on describing three key factors – intrinsic, extraneous, and germane –
which affect the cognitive load the learner must endure to process and learn new information.
Intrinsic cognitive load refers to the simplicity or difficulty level of the information itself. It is
impossible for the training designer to control for the intrinsic aspect of cognitive load.
Extraneous cognitive load refers to unnecessary information fed to learners outside of the to-belearned material. A training design goal is to minimize extraneous cognitive load for the learner
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through a clear presentation style (Kearns, 2010). Most important to this study is the germane
element, which suggests that learning should be tailored to how learners process new information
and construct schemas related to the training content. From a practical standpoint, the germane
cognitive load on learners can be reduced by using step-by-step examples, self-explanatory
activities, and practice. These techniques all promote the development and automation of
schemas, reducing the overall cognitive load on an individual (Pass, Renkl, & Sweller, 2003). A
third learning theory, goal theory, is important as it suggests that understanding what motivates
the learners – intrinsic and extrinsic factors – drive learners’ achievement of learning objectives.
It is common to find intrinsic factors such as seeking to master a skill, ability, or competence in a
task is a large motivator for pilots. Other extrinsically motivated trainees are motivated by the
value they place in out-performing their peers at a task (Noe, 2004). Goal theory suggests it is
important to first ensure training is designed to increase pilots’ competence at a specific task,
then to clearly express that objective to the learners. This objective must be ultimately fulfilled
in the training presentation by giving all training elements this same goal-oriented context (Noe,
2004).
Given their abundance in aviation, CRM training programs provide a general blueprint to
draw upon in the development of similar non-technical skill training programs. Given the mixed
results regarding the overall effectiveness of CRM training to perceptibly improve in-flight
behaviors (Salas et al., 2001, 2006), there are opportunities to draw upon some of its documented
successes in the future design of other non-technical skill training programs. In the case of
developing guidelines to improve pilot monitoring, the desired learning outcome is to train a
cognitive strategy: in this case, the learner must know how to scan and process information and
other signals coming from the aircraft and the other pilot and then decide how to allocate his or
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her attentional resources. Training a cognitive strategy should include (a) a verbal description of
the strategy, (b) strategy demonstration, (c) practice with feedback, and (d) use of a variety of
tasks that provide opportunity to apply the strategy (Noe, 2004). Jensen (1995) contends the
three learning principles of “practice, feedback, and ‘follow ideas with examples’” are the most
reliable conventions for generating behavior change (pp. 177-182). The use of situational
training or specific examples, followed by presenting opportunities for the learner to respond, is
especially reliable methods for teaching pilots (Jensen, 1995). According to Salas and
colleagues (2006), existing CRM training programs apply similar strategies, but lack
opportunities for learners to immediately practice what they have learned with feedback.
Consequently, to be effective, any new training program should incorporate these lessons.
An often overlooked, but critically important final step in training development is
planning for training evaluation (Noe, 2004). According to Kirkpatrick’s (1976) framework,
training evaluation is important as a tool to (a) decide whether to continue the program, and (b)
gain insights into how to improve the training program. Ideally, Kirkpatrick suggests, training
evaluation should be designed to consider outcomes at four levels: reactions, learning, behavior,
and results (1976). Reaction outcomes refer to the attitudes and perceptions of the learners
toward the training and whether it satisfied their needs, i.e., how they liked the training and how
useful they found it. Kirkpatrick recommends that organizations measure the trainees’ reactions
immediately and, when a multiple-choice questionnaire is used, to provide a range of
quantitative responses to each question. The second evaluation method, learning, refers to extent
which learners improved their knowledge of the subject matter of the training. Usually, this
measure consists of providing the learners a post-training test to identify if the learners acquired
the knowledge and/or cognitive skills of interest. To measure the learning effects of a training
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program, Kirkpatrick recommends using pre- and post-training tests and comparing results
between an experimental and control group. Also, Kirkpatrick recommends the test’s measures
should be objective and quantifiable. The third level, behaviors, examines whether the trainees’
behavior changed measurably as a result of the training. In aviation, such an evaluation for a
flight training program would consist of measuring indications that the training has changed pilot
behaviors in the flight environment. Organizations would accomplish this by taking appropriate
measurements before and after training or comparing performance between a control and
experimental group. Kirkpatrick suggests four conditions must exist in the learner for behaviors
to change. The learner must: (a) have a desire to change, (b) they must know what and how to
change, (c) the right climate must exist, and (d) they must be rewarded for changing
(Kirkpatrick, 1976). The fourth training evaluation level, results, refers to whether the training
has had an impact on some aspect of the organization’s bottom line. Kirkpatrick points out that
the focus and driving force behind developing the training program should be a results-level
goal. An organization’s results goals could be increased productivity, safety, cost savings, or
employee retention (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2006). To an aviation organization, for example,
the results of CRM training could be measured in terms of fewer human-error related accidents.
CRM training programs have, in fact, been evaluated from the perspective of Kirkpatrick’s
framework (Salas et al., 2001). Research into these programs identified that most CRM-related
training evaluations are more likely to consider either the reactions and learning outcomes than
the behavior and results outcomes as the latter two can be more difficult and time-consuming to
measure (Salas et al., 2001; Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001; Salas et al., 2006).
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E-Learning
Technology plays an increasingly powerful role in today’s training systems and offers
many advantages compared to more traditional training methods (Noe, 2004). In an exploratory
study, Raisinghani and colleagues (2005) found that pilots generally feel comfortable with
technology and confident in their personal ability to use e-learning. This research considers the
effectiveness of online training to train non-technical aviation skills. Online training (also
referred to as web-based training) refers to an instructional strategy in which a web-enabled
computer provides the learning stimulus, the trainee must respond to the stimulus, and the
computer analyzes the responses and provides feedback to the trainee (Rosenberg, 2001). Online
training can be delivered to learners by workstation, by smartphone, or by any other web-enabled
device. By comparison, e-learning is an umbrella term referring to delivery of any informational
content (does not necessarily have to be of an instructional nature) through networked electronic
technology (Rosenberg, 2001). E-learning is a term used in literature to contrast this type of
training from classroom-based learning and blended learning (i.e., combined use of classroom
and e-learning), the two other categories of learning environments. From a training design and
evaluation perspective, the effectiveness of any e-learning method greatly depends on applying
good learning principles (Noe, 2004, p. 233). One major advantage of online training is that it
can be configured to provide the learner with a more personalized training experience, providing
trainees with feedback on their performance using interactive games, simulations, quizzes, and
exercises to determine if they need additional practice (Kearns, 2009). Another advantage of
online training is that the programs tend to be highly accessible and self-paced, giving the learner
more control and flexibility to complete the training at a time convenient for them. Still, elearning (and hence online training) are not ideal for all types of training and upfront
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development times and costs are generally higher. Also, motor skills and attitudes train poorly
through e-learning, and generally these programs lack interactions with the instructors and other
learners which, in a lecture setting, for example, can add to the value of the experience (Kearns,
2009).
Studies into the effectiveness of online training can generally be found in meta-analyses
of comparative studies between classroom-based and e-learning (Bernard et al., 2004; Clark &
Mayer, 2006). Bernard and colleagues (2004) found no differences in effectiveness between elearning courses and classroom training, but did find wider variability in learning improvements
for e-learning courses. Specifically, they found asynchronous training outperformed classroom
training, while synchronous training did not (pp. 408-409). Asynchronous refers to self-paced
training that allows learners to complete the training at a time convenient for them. Synchronous
training, by comparison, refers to training in which the learners complete online training
simultaneously from various locations. This variability indicates that the more important factor
is the quality of the training, specifically, whether e-learning leverages the appropriate amount of
technology and tailors the course material to incorporate interaction and feedback into the
program design (Clark & Mayer, 2006). Designers are encouraged to adopt a constructive
architecture approach, where learners are provided opportunities to elaborate on concepts that
actively involve them and stimulate prior knowledge (Kearns, 2009). The bottom line is that
while e-learning has been shown to be more effective than classroom-based learning in some
cases, what is most important is that the designer understand issues of course content,
instructional design, and learner characteristics in order to maximize the effectiveness of elearning (Rosenberg, 2001; Kearns, 2010).

25

Purpose of this Study
Data from aircraft accidents and line observation studies indicate that inadequate and
insufficient pilot monitoring and cross-checking is a growing safety concern within the industry.
Within the cockpit environment, there is ample evidence that pilots who fail to properly manage
their workload commit more monitoring errors. Given the lack of monitoring training programs
available to pilots, more research is needed to investigate the effectiveness of types of training
that can be used to improve their cross-checking and monitoring skills. The present study seeks
to determine the effectiveness of an interactive, online program to improve pilots’ monitoring
behaviors. The focus of this research was to measure voluntary changes in non-flying pilots’
monitoring practices, particularly within the framework of high-workload environments. The
researchers designed and administered an online training program with a strong focus on
providing opportunities for the learners to practice and receive performance feedback during inflight scenarios. Our objective was to show positive transfer of monitoring behaviors trained in
the online program to the cockpit of a high fidelity flight simulator. A multivariate analysis was
used to evaluate the training’s effectiveness by comparing specific, voluntary behaviors of
trained teams versus control teams.
Statement of Hypotheses
The primary research question is to determine if online training would affect the pilots’
performance at in-flight monitoring-related tasks. It is expected that the training will improve
both pilots’ understanding of monitoring and their performance of monitoring tasks during
vertical phases of flight. The following hypotheses were examined:
Hypothesis 1. Trained participants will react more positively to the training activity than
the control group reacts to the control activity. Specifically, according to a composite reactions
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score, trained participants will rate the training’s usefulness and instructional value higher than
participants in the control group.
Hypothesis 2. Trained participants will be able to demonstrate knowledge and
application of the training program’s learning objectives in a written test. Specifically,
participants completing the online monitoring skill training will score higher on the post-training
multiple-choice test than the pilots completing the control activity.
Hypothesis 3. There will be a transfer effect of the online training as evidenced by use of
the “5-2-1” rule during a training event in the flight simulator. Specifically, aircrews in the
training group will use the 5-2-1 callouts more frequently than the untrained pilots in the flight
simulator.
Hypothesis 4. There will be an effect of the online training on the number of voluntary
callouts pilots make during a training event in the flight simulator. Specifically, non-flying pilots
in the training group will make more altitude callouts per minute (i.e., callout ratio) than nonflying pilots in the control group in the flight simulator.
Hypothesis 5. There will be an effect of the online training on the aircrews’ success at
climb and descent tasks during a training event in a flight simulator. Specifically, the trained
group will make fewer errors in successfully completing climb and descent tasks than the control
group in the flight simulator.
This study also includes a possible covariate, aviation experience, as previous studies
suggest that senior pilots tend to be more proactive monitors than junior pilots (Foushee &
Helmreich, 1988, Jentsch et al., 1999). This study predicts:
Hypothesis 6. There will be a relationship between aircrew experience and performance
gains from the online training. Specifically, aircrews containing a junior pilot (i.e., one that is
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designated a copilot or first pilot) will experience greater performance gains across the
dependent variables in comparison to the aircrews with more senior pilots.
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Methods
Design
This field study used a posttest-only design with a comparison group, comparing
behavioral differences between an experimental (training received) and a control (no training
received) group. Monitoring skill training was the between-subjects independent variable;
participants in the experimental group completed a 30-minute computer-based monitoring skills
training program while participants in the control group completed a control activity. Following
the training activity, participants were paired into teams and flew a 2.5-hour event in a highfidelity flight simulator, followed by a similar 2.5-hour simulator event the next day. The pilots
used for the study were all fully-qualified in the aircraft, although experience levels and
designations varied somewhat between pilots.
Monitoring skills were measured according to D. L. Kirkpatrick’s 4-level framework
(1976). Researchers first measured variables regarding participants’ reactions and learning
outcomes using a questionnaire and post-training test. Next, the researchers measured aircrews’
behaviors and task outcomes along four dependent variables by observing recorded data from a
flight simulator.
Participants
Participants in this study were U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) pilots qualified to fly the H-65
helicopter (N = 55). The ages of the participants ranged from 26 to 52 years (M = 33.5). Fifty
were males and five were females. Total flight hours ranged from 430 to 4,700 (M = 2,014, Mdn
= 1,786). At a minimum, each pilot had completed initial military flight training at least a year
prior and was currently instrument-rated. Based on a combination of experience with the type of
helicopter (H-65) and USCG operations, each had achieved one of four pilot designations within
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the service. Ranked from lowest to highest, these designations are: copilot (CP), first pilot (FP),
aircraft commander (AC), and instructor pilot (IP). At least an AC designation is required for a
pilot to be put in charge of an actual USCG mission. This designation is aircraft-specific, so, for
example, a 5,000-hour pilot who is newly qualified in this type of helicopter could still be
designated as a CP, even if they had achieved an AC rating in another type of aircraft. There
were no significant differences between the groups in terms of age, pilot designation, total flight
hours, flight hours in type aircraft, or hours flown in the last 60 days. A summary of pilot
experience is provided in Table 1.
Table 1
Pilot Experience
Gender
Mean age
Mean total flight time
Mean flight time in type
Mean flight time past 60 days
Current designation

Trained (n = 25)
2 female, 23 male
34.9 (6.54)
2,150 (1,260)
1,466 (1,065)
38.9 (16.8)
6 CPs
2 FPs
12 ACs
5 IPs

Control (n = 30)
3 female, 27 male
32.3 (3.86)
1,896 (966)
1,275 (939)
40.7 (15.6)
6 CP
2 FP
17 AC
5 IP

Total (N = 55)
5 female, 50 male
33.5 (5.39)
2,014 (1,103)
1,364 (992)
39.9 (15.4)
12 CPs
4 FPs
29 ACs
10 IPs

Note: Mean results are shown with standard deviations in parentheses (where applicable).

All participants completed the training activity and the master questionnaire containing
the reaction, test, and attitudes measures. Of these 55 participants, 44 participants were paired
into two-person teams whose performance was then evaluated in the flight simulator (N = 22).
Eleven of these participants (3 trained and 8 control participants) were not included in the results
from the simulator observations discussed in hypotheses 3 through 6. The two reasons
participants were not included in the simulator observations were because either: (a) the
participant’s simulator event was not recorded (e.g., the simulator event instructor/supervisor
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forgot to press record button) or (b) only one of the two paired participants agreed to participate
in the study (e.g., one participant opted out of the research at some point). The researchers
decided to keep the reactions and learning measures from these participants as this data still
provided relevant information to help validate the effectiveness of the online training and
contributed to the analysis of monitoring-related attitudes. Demographic and flight experience
information for the participants who were included in the simulator portion of the study is
included in Table 2. Because these 44 participants were observed in pairs during the simulator
portion of the study, the number of total observed “teams” was cut in half to 22, i.e., an n of 11
teams observed in each of the two conditions.
Table 2
Demographics for Participants in Flight Simulator
Mean total flight time
Mean flight time in type
Mean flight time past 60 days
Current designation

Gender
Mean age

Trained (n = 22)
1,970 (1,148)
1,392 (1,074)
41.1 (16.3)
5 CPs
1 FPs
12 ACs
4 IPs
1 female, 21 male
33.7 (5.19)

Control (n = 22)
2,106 (949)
1,389 (1,015)
42.7 (12.2)
3 CP
2 FP
12 AC
5 IP
2 female, 20 male
32.9 (3.77)

Note: Mean results are shown with standard deviations in parentheses (where applicable).

To recruit participants, the USCG allowed the researchers to use pilots attending a oneweek annual proficiency course in Mobile, AL. Participants normally complete 8 to 10 ½ hours
of classroom training, participate in four 2- to 3-hour events in a full-motion flight simulator, and
take a written exam as part of their normal duties during the week (see Table 3). This study
added a 30-minute training activity, completed individually, to augment the week’s training, and
examined performance on two of the pilots’ simulator events. Participants were paired for flight
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simulator training by the USCG at least a month in advance the course. The requirements for a
crew pairing were that the pilots cannot be from the same unit and that at least one pilot holds an
AC or IP designation. Given the approximately 500 H-65 helicopter pilots in the USCG fleet, it
would be unusual that the pilots paired for the proficiency course had previously flown together.
Table 3
USCG Training Schedule during 1-week Proficiency Training Course
Name

Type

Instrument flight rules training
Lecture
Emergency procedures training
Simulator
Flight planning training
Lecture/Demo
Instructional methods (optional)
Lecture
IFR scenario #1*
Simulator
Ship-helo operations
Simulator
USCG SOP/regs training
Lecture
CRM training
Lecture
IFR scenario #2*
Simulator
Operational procedures check
Simulator
IFR procedures exam
Online Exam
*Source of data captured for this study

Day of week
Monday
Monday or Tuesday
Monday
Monday
Tuesday or Wednesday
Wednesday
Wednesday
Wednesday
Wednesday or Thursday
Thursday or Friday
Due NLT Friday

Apparatus
Informed consent. The researchers used an informed consent form, based on the
American Psychological Association’s standard, procedures, and protocols. The consent form
was approved by both Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University’s institutional review board and
the USCG’s scientific review committee (SRC) and will be stored with project records for a
period of six years. In the consent form, each participant acknowledged they understood their
participation was voluntary and that their identity would be kept confidential. A copy of the
informed consent form is included in Appendix A.
Demographic survey. Researchers administered an online demographic survey to
collect general information regarding the participants. The survey collected specific information
which could have an effect on measurement outcomes. Info included: age, gender, total flight
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time, flight time in type aircraft, flight time in the past 60 days, and crew designation (CP, FP,
AC, or IP; see Table 1). A copy of the demographic questions is included in Appendix B.
Online training. The training course was an original, asynchronous, computer-based
training program titled: crew monitoring and cross-checking skill training. The training was
designed following the ADDIE (analysis, design, develop, implement, evaluation) framework for
instructional design (Kearns, 2010). The first step was to analyze the pilots’ need for monitoring
skill training and to plan a tailored e-learning instructional approach. The researchers chose to
deliver the course via computer to allow the learning to be a highly interactive experience for the
learners, providing them with performance feedback spaced throughout the lesson. The
electronic, web-based format also allowed the researchers the ability to track learner
performance. After the basic architecture was designed, the course was developed using
Microsoft PowerPoint. Three subject-matter experts (SMEs) reviewed the training and provided
feedback. Finally, the training was published for use in Adobe PDF format. The PDF was
uploaded to the website containing the online questionnaire and so learners could only link to the
training after finishing the demographic survey. The instructions explained that the course had
to be completed in one sitting and would take approximately 30 minutes.
Based both on Sumwalt et al. (2002) and Loukopoulos, Dismukes, and Barshi’s (2003)
recommendations for aircrew-specific monitoring training, the course followed a five-step
outline using the following headings: importance of monitoring, what to monitor, how to
monitor, practice, and end-of-course test. Upon completion of each of the first three sections,
the program required the learners answer 2 or 3 multiple-choice questions to evaluate their
understanding of the material presented in the preceding section. The learners received feedback
on whether a response was correct or incorrect, and the program’s functionality allowed learners
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to repeatedly select incorrect responses until the correct answer was chosen, at which point the
learner could move to the next section.
The following is a description of each section. Importance of monitoring provided
learners with a vivid real-world example of the consequences of poor monitoring and
familiarized the learners with monitoring concepts. The section what to monitor focused on
teaching the concepts behind the “areas of vulnerability” chart (see Figure 1). The section how
to monitor taught the learners how to apply the “5-2-1 rule” to prevent in-flight level-off errors.
The 5-2-1 rule was developed by the researchers specifically for this study as a memory device
to promote having non-flying pilots monitor and callout specific altitudes to alert the flying pilots
that they are approaching a required level off altitude (or decision height). During vertical
phases of flight (i.e., climbs and descents), the rule required the PNF callout at 500, 200, and 100
feet prior to reaching all target altitudes. The rule was loosely derived from an airline SOP
requirement that states the PNF shall make a callout at 1,000 feet prior to arriving at any target
altitude and then both pilots must exclusively monitor altitude until the level off is complete
(Sumwalt et al., 2002; Dismukes & Berman, 2010). Since helicopters make smaller-increment
altitude transitions and use climb rates of a smaller magnitude, the researchers chose to use a
smaller scale (relative to commercial jets operations) of 500 feet and below for this training
program. The next section, practice, gave the learners a chance to apply the 5-2-1 rule in several
scenarios. Since this rule required some simple mental math, each scenario presented the aircraft
in a climb or descent and had the participants respond where the next callout would occur. The
researchers believed that having learners practice scenario-driven mental math in these exercises
was an effective method for facilitating development of the same mental processes required for
the in-flight 5-2-1 task and increase the transfer of training. Following the practice session, the
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participants were given a link to a 10-item multiple choice test to assess the participants’
knowledge and application of the monitoring strategies.
Extensive effort was devoted to create a novel, yet practical training program. The author
developed this training curriculum after having taken a graduate-level course in training systems
and performance measurement. The author also consulted several articles (Jensen, 1995;
Sumwalt et al., 2002), books (Noe, 2004; Kearns, 2010), safety training presentations (Dismukes
& Berman, 2007; Sumwalt, 2009; Curzio & Arroyo, 2010), and on-line resources in the design
and development of this training program. The researcher also consulted aviation SMEs within
the USCG to ensure the content and methods align with the organizational goals (R. Donnell,
personal communication, January 30, 2011). A complete reproduction of the lesson slides used
for the training program is included in Appendix C.
Control group activity. From a research design perspective, providing control group
participants with a control activity is useful in keeping the research experience of the
experimental and control groups as identical as possible. In this study, the researchers gave the
control participants a six-page article to read from Flight Safety Foundation’s AeroSafety World
magazine on the subject of aircrew multitasking (Loukopoulos, Dismukes, & Barshi, 2009,
August). Following the activity, a 10-item multiple choice test was administered to participants
identical to the one given to those receiving the computer-based monitoring training.
Questionnaire. The sections described below – containing a test, a reactions
questionnaire, and an opinions questionnaire – were all presented in a single master
questionnaire constructed using the web-based SurveyGizmo program, a product of Widgix, LCC
(www.surveygizmo.com). Two master questionnaires were designed and used for this study:
one was administered to the training group and one to the control group.
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Post-training test. The researchers designed an online, 10-item multiple-choice test to
assess the participants’ learning, i.e., examine whether the leaning objectives were met. The
researchers gave the same test to both groups of participants – the trained participants completed
it upon completion of the online training and the control group completed the test following their
control activity. Four questions tested the participants’ ability to apply the 5-2-1 rule and six
questions tested their declarative knowledge of monitoring concepts, such as the areas of
vulnerability chart. Appendix D lists all 10 questions.
Reactions questionnaire. Following the training, the researchers gave participants in the
training group a seven-item, online reactions questionnaire to assess their attitudes (i.e.,
satisfaction and perceived utility level) toward the training. The researchers provided the control
participants with a modified questionnaire containing only four of the seven questions that were
provided to the training group. The researchers agreed that three of the reactions questions were
critical to the trainees’ evaluation of the utility of the computer-based training program, but were
distracting to the control group participants’ evaluation of the control activity. The questions are
presented in Appendix E.
For purposes of presenting the results of the reactions questionnaire, three questions were
chosen to group into a composite reactions score for each participant and allow for a betweengroups comparison of reactions to either the training or control activity. The reliability of this
composite reactions score (based on averaging identically-scaled questionnaire responses) was
determined to be high, as Cronbach’s α = 0.79.
Attitudes questionnaire. Gagne (1984) held the belief that attitudes should be considered
a learning outcome, explaining that attitudes affect individuals’ behaviors, actions, and
performance. Kraiger, Ford, and Salas (1993) also contended that Kirkpatrick’s (1976)
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framework ignores affectively-based measures of learning, opting instead for reactions measures.
Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2006) have since elaborated that changes in trainees’ attitudes are a
dimension that may be used to infer “learning” outcomes, which include knowledge, skills, or
attitudes. Given that so little is known about pilots’ monitoring habits and priorities, the
researchers thought it useful to solicit attitude data pertaining to pilot’s attitudes towards specific
monitoring roles and responsibilities. This data would contribute to a needs assessment for the
development of future training programs related to monitoring. The researchers designed a 23item assessment of participants’ attitudes and perceptions toward monitoring and other nonflying pilot duties. The questions here were directed at determining how the participants ranked
monitoring among their other non-flying pilot duties, what flight instruments they considered
most important to monitor, and what phases of flight they considered monitoring to be most
important. None of the questions were directly related to any of the online training program’s
content. All participants completed this section of the questionnaire as the last section in the
questionnaire (Appendix F).
Flight simulator and debriefing station. Participants’ monitoring performance was
observed using their recorded performance in an H-65 helicopter (military version of the
Eurocopter AS365) simulator. This is a high-fidelity representation of an aircraft each
participant was fully qualified to fly. The flight simulator rests on a motion platform which
moves in six degrees of freedom and provides the pilots with more than 225 degrees of
horizontal visual display of the outside world (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2. USCG H-65 Helicopter Flight Simulator.
Each simulator event began in a briefing room with a single flight instructor briefing the
two-person crew on the content of the session. The crew boarded the simulator with the two
pilots (participants) sitting side-by-side in the pilot seats and the instructor sitting behind them at
a control console, with the ability to manipulate the simulation (e.g., start, stop, introduce poor
weather, reposition the aircraft, introduce simulated emergencies, etc.). Additionally, the
instructor played the role of the air traffic controller (ATC) and communicated with the pilots to
provide flight clearances and other required messages. The flight simulator was equipped with
flight data and voice recording capabilities which were uploaded to a single-purpose workstation
(computer) with three monitors called the computer-aided debriefing station (CAD), which was
located in an adjacent briefing room. When the event was over, the computer used speciallydesigned software (called the “CADS replay client”) as an interface to enable the instructors to
debrief the pilots by examining recorded data from the flight instruments and radio
communications. Like any digital recording, the instructors had the option to play the entire
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event or jump to a specific task to view. The CAD display also provided an over-the-shoulder
(OTS) video recording of the event (upper-right corner, Figure 3). For this study, the
experimenter exclusively used the CAD software to review and collect data from simulator
events, using a process which will be described in the next section. Note: The CAD software did
not enable the researchers to view raw or exact simulator data, e.g., to-the-exact-foot altitude
readings. This data was instead read from a needle on a computer rendering of the same analog
gauge that is in the aircraft (see primary instrument displays in lower right corner of Figure 3).

Figure 3. CADS Replay Software Screen
Flight scenarios. Recent research has made use of Line Operations Safety Audits
(LOSA) and Line Operational Simulations (LOS) to enable organizations to gather robust
performance data exploring the types of errors flight crews make during line operations and
scenario-based training events (Sumwalt et al., 2002; FAA, 2004b, 2006). For example, this data
has enabled managers to identify error-prone situations and then to adjust the relevant
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operational procedures and checklists to make them safer (Flight Safety Foundation, 2005; FAA,
2006; Loukopoulos et al., 2009). The use of data gathered in real or simulated line environments
marks an important step towards proactively improving aviation safety, i.e., without having to
wait for something to go wrong to realize a problem exists.
For this study, the researchers used the CAD recordings and adopted a similar
observational strategy to evaluate aircrews’ monitoring behaviors during routine simulator
training events. A group of USCG flight instructors (i.e., SMEs) develop standardized simulator
scripts for an assortment of pilot skill training and mission training needs. The scenario scripts
are updated annually, therefore, the types of tasks, stressors, and decision-making scenarios
presented to the aircrews during these events should be up to date, challenging, and
representative of the line environment (J. Cabell, personal communication, November 1, 2010).
The researchers examined crew performance in a flight simulator during two specific
“scenario” events designated as IFR scenario #1 and IFR scenario #2. The maneuvers and
context of these scenarios were scripted based on the tasks required to complete an annual USCG
instrument proficiency check flight, which was consistent with the requirements of a FAA
instrument proficiency check (FAA, 2004c). In terms of task similarity, the two IFR scenario
events were very similar (Table 4).
During either IFR scenario event, the instructor evaluated the two pilots from a control
station as the crew conducted a planned flight from a departure point to a destination airport with
four practice instrument approaches and other tasks along the way. Particularly of interest to this
study were the crews’ monitoring behaviors during vertical flight (i.e., climbs and descents).
There are two general categories of instrument approaches – precision and non-precision – of
which crews must fly two of each. An instrument approach is a procedure associated with a
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specific airport to allow a crew, solely using their aircraft instrumentation, to fly from a
predetermined point in space down to a position close to the runway at an airport where the crew
can visually land the aircraft. The point at which the crew must be able to land the aircraft
visually is called either the missed approach point (MAP) or decision height (DH), at which
time, if the crew cannot proceed visually, must instead abort the approach and climb away from
the airport in a procedure called the missed approach. Precision approaches require more
accurate navigational aids and follow more restrictive flight path parameters which allow the
aircraft to descend a few hundred feet closer to the runway environment without having it in
sight. The pilots have planned the route of flight in advance, so the sequence of three of the
approaches was known prior to the flight. The final approach was added to the scenario by the
instructor manipulating the weather conditions at one of the airports so that an alternative
approach must be attempted. From the USCG’s perspective, each event was designed to
evaluate the pilot in the role of the pilot in-command (PIC).
The main difference between the two IFR scenarios was that the two flights use different
airports, meaning that the altitudes, headings, and timing requirements built into each of the
approaches are different. The instructors generally followed an instructional script kept secret
from the crews under evaluation. The instructor’s script ensured a high level of standardization
between flights – it prompts the instructors to manipulate certain in-flight variables to give the
flight more task realism, pose certain challenges to the crews, and force the crew to adapt to
changes from the original plan – all while ensuring the basic and necessary tasks of the flight
were completed. The instructors had the authority to customize the training to an extent (e.g.,
vary holding instructions, increase frequency of altitude changes), and initiate three or four
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simulated in-flight emergencies of their choosing per flight (J. Cabell, personal communication,
November 1, 2010).
Table 4
Instrument Approaches Flown by IFR Scenario
IFR scenario #1
1. PAR (precision approach radar) approach to
runway 22 at NAS New Orleans

IFR scenario #2
1. ILS approach to runway 6 at Columbus Metro
Airport

2. NDB (non-directional beacon) approach to
runway 18 at Hammond Regional Airport

2. NDB approach to runway 6 at Columbus Metro
Airport

3. VOR (VHF omni range) approach to runway 22
at Baton Rouge Metro

3. VOR approach to runway 15 at Lawson AAF

4. ILS (instrument landing system) approach to
runway 22 at Baton Rouge Metro

4. PAR approach to runway 33 at Lawson AAF

The other difference between the flights was that for evaluation purposes, the role of PIC
was exchanged between the pilots. For all flying events, one pilot is assigned the authority role
of pilot-in-command (PIC), and the other is assigned the role of copilot (CP). These roles are
equivalent to the captain and first officer roles used in commercial aviation, respectively, in
terms of authority and responsibility. The PIC role is assigned to the pilot with the higher
designation and if the designations are the same, to the pilot with more seniority within the
organization. So, for purposes of training and evaluation, instead of a normal crew assignment,
the junior pilot would be assigned as PIC over the more-experienced pilot for one of the
simulator events.
Debriefing script. As an ethical precaution, the researchers debriefed each of the
participants at the completion of the experiment. A copy of the debriefing script is presented in
Appendix G.
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Procedure
Prior to attending the USCG flight training course, all pilots scheduled for training during
a given week were assigned into two-person teams (i.e., individual flight crews) by the USCG.
The researchers assigned the two-person teams to their condition – training or control – based on
a predetermined alternating week-to-week schedule. This meant that all teams arriving on a
given week would be assigned to the same condition. (Since the pilots attending the course on
any given week spend a significant amount of time together as a larger group [classroom
training, meals, berthing, etc.] it was determined that splitting groups within a week opened up
the possibility that the individuals would discuss the two training activities during breaks and
social periods of the week and introduce a potential confounding variable.) Based on this
assignment, the researchers ensured that once the pilots arrived at the course both paired pilots
followed the set of instructions in accordance with the correct sequence for their assigned
condition, as outlined in Table 5. The pilots performed all steps of the sequence individually
except for the flight simulator portion, which they completed as a crew of two.
Upon arrival at the first training event of the week, the researchers provided all
participants with the informed consent form to review and sign (Appendix A). At the bottom of
the consent form was a website link to the online training (or control activity) and questionnaires.
Each participant received one of two links, depending if they were in the training group or the
control group. The researchers directed pilots to individual workstations with instructions to
login and follow the program’s directions. Once logged in, the participants first entered their
demographic information (Appendix B). At this point, the questionnaire directed the participants
in one of two ways based on the training condition. Pilots in the training/experimental group
completed the “aircrew monitoring and cross-checking” training session (Appendix C). The
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pilots in the control group completed the control activity. Having completed either activity, the
participants next completed a 10-item multiple choice test to evaluate their learning of the
material (Appendix D). The participants’ responses on this test were recorded. After the test,
the participants continued using the online questionnaire to provide their reactions to the training
activity (Appendix E). Here, the questionnaires differed slightly by condition: the training group
responded to seven (7) questions with regards to the training while the control group answered
just four (4) questions. Following the reactions portion of the questionnaire, each participant
answered a 23-item survey exploring their attitudes and perceptions towards the monitoring roles
and responsibilities of pilots (Appendix F). This activity completed the training and
questionnaire portion of the experiment and the participants were informed the experimental
training was complete and they should follow their normal USCG-directed schedule to complete
the rest of the week’s training events (see Table 3).
The course’s week-long flight simulator schedule normally consisted of each aircrew
completing one simulator event per day, according to a prescribed sequence. In each case, the
teams all flew a 2.5 hour “emergency procedures training” event in the flight simulator before
commencing IFR scenario #1. This “warm-up” event, in effect, helped the participants to adjust
to the simulator and reduced any unfamiliarity with the simulator that would affect their
performance on the IFR scenarios (the events of interest to this study). All of these events were
recorded using the CAD system, yet neither the pilot participants nor their instructors had
knowledge of which flights or aspects of the simulator flights were of interest to the study,
outside the information provided in the participant consent form. At the end of the week, the
researchers provided a debriefing summary to each participant.
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Table 5
Procedure
Experimental Group

Control Group

Consent form: Participants read and sign consent form.

Consent form: Participants read and sign consent form.

Demographics: Participants answer six demographic
questions including: total flight time, flight time in type
aircraft, 60-day flight time, pilot designation, age, and
gender.

Demographics: Participants answer six demographic
questions including: total flight time, flight time in type
aircraft, 60-day flight time, pilot designation, age, and
gender.

Training: Participants in this group complete a 30minute online training program.

Control activity: Participants read a five-page article on
multitasking (15-20 minutes)

Test (learning): Participants were administered a 10item test to evaluate whether they learned the
information contained in the training program.

Test (learning): Participants were administered a 10item test to evaluate their knowledge of the
information contained in the training program. (This
group was not trained the material covered in the test,
but was included to establish a baseline level of pilot
knowledge on the subject matter.)

Reactions: Participants answer seven (7) questions
regarding their attitudes toward the online training
program.

Reactions: Participants answer four (4) questions
regarding their attitudes toward the control activity.

Monitoring habits and attitudes questionnaire: The
participants answer 23 questions expressing their
monitoring habits and perceptions of monitoring
importance.

Monitoring habits and attitudes questionnaire: The
participants answer 23 questions expressing their
monitoring habits and perceptions of monitoring
importance.

Flight simulator: Over the next two days, participants
complete two events in a flight simulator (IFR scenario 1
then IFR scenario 2) as part of their scheduled (normal)
annual training. Both simulator events are instrument
check rides and last 2 to 2.5 hours.

Flight simulator: Over the next two days, participants
complete two events in a flight simulator (IFR scenario
1 then IFR scenario 2) as part of their scheduled
(normal) annual training. Both simulator events are
instrument check rides and last 2 to 2.5 hours.

Debriefing: Researchers send an email to debrief each
participant on the intent of the study.

Debriefing: Researchers send an email to debrief each
participant on the intent of the study.

After all simulator events were done for a given week, a USCG representative would
download the week’s CAD data for all IFR scenario events, save them to an external memory
device, and provide them to the researchers. Each event computer file was only labeled with a
time stamp to keep researchers blind to each team’s names and training condition.
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Two H-65 pilots served as SME raters/evaluators to observe the teams’ recorded
performance. Both SMEs had over 2,500 flying hours in the H-65 and 3+ years of experience as
flight instructors. Both raters received a two-hour block of training in the use of a structured
performance evaluation methodology (see Measures section). After the raters rated an event, a
USCG representative provided the researchers with a master schedule to allow them to correlate
missing participant data to each event. This data included the dates of the events, the participant
identification codes for the events (to allow the researcher to correlate the pilots’ experience and
demographic information), and the crews’ training group assignment.
In summary, the participants individually completed a training activity, a test, and two
questionnaires – all online. Then, paired into teams, the participants completed their scheduled
flight training in the simulator. The researchers observed tapes of the aircrews’ performance,
but were kept blind to which group the aircrews were in until after conducting the review. After
the review, the USCG representative shared records showing the pilots and their simulator
schedule for the week so the researchers were able to correlate this observational data with the
participants’ data (training condition, test scores, and questionnaire responses).
Measures
The training was evaluated on all four levels of Kirkpatrick’s typology (1976). For
reactions outcomes, all pilots receiving the training were surveyed to elicit feedback on the
usefulness and likeability of the training. For learning outcomes, a 10-item test was given to
both trained and untrained participants. The differences between groups were analyzed. Next,
the researchers observed and compared the trained group of pilots (experimental group) and an
untrained group (control group) on their performance in a flight simulator. The researchers used
this setting to measure whether the learners applied the trained skills, i.e., do or do not the trained
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behaviors transfer to performance measures in an on-the-job setting, a measure of Kirkpatrick’s
behavior outcomes (1976). Finally, the researchers recorded whether the crew had or had not
met a specific performance standard at the critical point for the climb or descent task – a
measure directed at evaluating the task from the perspective of Kirkpatrick’s results category.
Independent variable - training. The independent variable for this study was the
monitoring skill training. This was a between-groups measure in that paired participants (i.e., a
single aircrew) were assigned to either the trained (experimental) or the untrained (control) group
(Table 6).
Covariate – pilot experience. While not the primary focus, this study provided an
opportunity to examine the role of pilot experience in monitoring performance. As previously
mentioned, the flying role is transferred frequently between pilots during a flight, so there is not
a single pilot who is the PNF for each event. In fact, the time spent in this role was highly
variable across flights and is by-in-large directed by the pilot-in-command and their personal
“cockpit management” style (J. Cabell, personal communication, November 1, 2010). However,
since both pilots are assigned the same training or control condition, team performance was
compared by using their pilot designations. For purposes of this study, CPs and FPs were
considered to be junior pilots and ACs and IPs to be senior pilots. The research accounted for
experience by reporting whether a paired flight crew did or did not contain a junior pilot.
Generally, a pilot upgrades to the AC designation after two to three years of experience in the
type of aircraft. Additional information was recorded pertaining to the simulator events
regarding training latency, which will be explained in the Discussion section (Table 6).
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Table 6
Independent Variables and Covariates
Variable
Group

How Measured/Levels
1 – No training received (control)
2 – Online training received (experimental)

Designation of junior pilot

1 – CP; 2 – FP; 3 – AC; 4 – IP

Designation of senior pilot

1 – CP; 2 – FP; 3 – AC; 4 – IP

Junior pilot (CP or FP)
aboard?

1 – Yes; 2 – No

Training latency – senior
pilot

Time between training completion and first
simulator event (reported in hours)

Training latency – junior
pilot

Time between training completion and first
simulator event (reported in hours)

Dependent variables. The researchers developed seven outcome measures to evaluate
the effects of the training: reactions composite score, reaction change score, post-training test
score, 5-2-1 compliance, callout ratio, task success rate, and overshoot magnitude (see Table 7).
The first three measures were taken from the questionnaire data and the last four used rater
observations. Two raters, both SMEs within the USCG, were used for both the 5-2-1 compliance
and the callout ratio measures. Before conducting any observations for the research, the raters
met with some general guidelines and reviewed two simulator event recordings (the events used
for rater training were not included in this study). The raters watched the recordings together
with the goal to develop a feasible and consistent method to rate the events. The researcher and
the SME worked together to develop two grade sheets, one for each of the two IFR scenarios, to
standardize the observation process (see Appendix H). After this process was complete, the
raters utilized the grade sheet to rate events independently. Once both sets of observations were
complete, the raters compared results. The raters’ reliability index (i.e., probability of
agreement) is reported in the next section. The raters re-evaluated all results that did not match
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and came to agreement on the best score to give. This resulted in a third set of scores which
were used in the final analysis. This performance measurement was fairly straightforward in the
sense that it is a non-evaluative description of a behavior and the opportunity for subjectivity is
remote; however, using two evaluators allowed the researchers to establish a measure of interrater reliability and alleviate concerns of experimenter bias.
Table 7
Dependent Variables
Dependent variable

Units of measure

Reactions composite

1 to 5 (participant rating)

Reaction change

-4 to 4 (participant rating)

Test score

0-100%

5-2-1 compliance (2 raters)

0-100%

Non-flying pilot callout ratio (2 raters)
Task success rate
Overshoot

Callouts per minute
0-100%
Feet

Reactions score. Participants rated their reactions to the training across several specific
items on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from low (score 1) to high (score 5). The researchers
averaged the participants’ responses to three of the questions and used this composite score to
compare the experimental groups’ reactions to the training. The questions included in this
measure included: (a) “rate the extent you expect this training will make a difference in the way
you do your job,” (b) “rate your overall knowledge of monitoring after the training activity,” and
(c) “rate this training course overall.”
The researchers developed a second “change in reactions” measure by taking each
participant’s rating (from 1 to 5) of their own “overall knowledge of monitoring” after the
training and subtracting their response to the same question (using the same scale) referring to
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their self-assessed knowledge before the training. Scores for this measure could theoretically
range from -4 to +4, but the researchers anticipated it would be rare for a learner to report a
decrease in their overall knowledge and a score of zero would be the lowest score a respondent
would normally give.
Post-training test score. Each participant received an individual score representing the
number of correct responses provided on the 10-item post-training test. This number of correct
responses was converted into a percentage and reported on a scale from 0 to 100 percent.
5-2-1 compliance. The raters first referenced the instructor guide (i.e., standardized
script) for both simulator events of interest to the study and created a list of the vertical flight
tasks the crew would be required to perform. For example, after the team takes off (in the
simulator), the script might call for the instructor to give the crew a climb to 4,000, followed by a
descent to an airport that would require a descent to 500 feet. The researchers would categorize
this as two separate vertical tasks. For IFR scenario #1, the researchers measured variables
associated with a total of four (4) climb tasks and four (4) descent tasks. For IFR scenario #2,
the researchers also measured variables associated with four (4) climbs and four (4) descents. In
summary, over two events, each crew pairing would be evaluated on a total of 16 climb or
descent tasks, i.e., 16 tasks-of-interest (see Table 8). The 5-2-1 compliance variable was
measured by recording the safety pilots’ level of conformance to the 5-2-1 rule taught during the
online training course. To calculate this measure, the raters would use the CAD recording to
review the final 500 feet of each of the 16 tasks-of-interest. The raters would use a check-off
sheet to record whether the PNF made altitude advisory-type callouts at 500 feet, 200 feet, and/or
100-feet prior to arriving at the target altitude, while watching a replay of the event in real time.
The total number of 5-2-1 callouts was divided by the total number of opportunities (three per
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climb or descent) to determine an overall compliance level for each crew. For example, if the
PNF reported 500 and 100 feet prior to level off for a climb task, and later reported 100 feet prior
to the minimum descent altitude (MDA) on the subsequent descent, the reported compliance rate
for the two maneuvers would be 50% (3 out of a possible 6). The raters agreed that any
reference to either the number of feet prior (relative altitude, e.g., “200 to go”) or a report of the
actual altitude (e.g., “700 feet for 500 feet”) would constitute an appropriate 5-2-1 callout. (Note:
Any SP-initiated callouts during a climb or descent were a voluntary behavior by the SP.) Each
crew pairing would receive a score representing their overall percentage of possible 5-2-1
callouts made on the 16 climbs and descents, i.e., the percentage of 5-2-1 callouts the PNF made
out of 48 possible callouts (see Table 7). In the case the PF did not reach an anticipated altitude
callout checkpoint during a task-of-interest because of an emergency or other problem with the
task, the raters would make note of which callout opportunities were lost and subtract this
number from the team’s total possible 5-2-1 compliance calls.
In this study, the two raters initially agreed on 93 percent (275 of 296) of their 5-2-1
callout tallies. The raters re-examined the callouts in dispute and were able to come to 100%
agreement, and the revised tallies were used for these comparisons.
Callout ratio. The callout ratio measure, by comparison, captured the frequency which
non-flying pilot made any altitude callouts during the last 1,000 feet of each task of interest.
Using the same 16 specific tasks-of-interest, the raters would, independently, take the CAD
recordings from the simulator to the point which the crew was climbing or descending through
an altitude 1,000 feet prior to the target altitude, record the time, and press play. At this point,
any PNF reference to the aircraft’s altitude until reaching the target altitude would be tallied as a
callout. Upon reaching the target altitude, the time would again be recorded, and the total number
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of PNF callouts would be recorded for that specific task. The raters would continue to record the
number of callouts during the same 1,000-foot window of each of the crew’s 15 remaining tasksof-interest. The total number of callouts would be divided by the total elapsed time. This
statistical result would represent the crew’s callout ratio (reported in callouts-per-minute). Any
PNF-initiated callouts during a climb or descent were a voluntary action by the PNF, and are not
required per any formal USCG procedure. These callouts provided explicit indications that the
PNF was actively monitoring and checking the aircraft’s flight path and, at the very least,
periodically integrating this responsibility with any other flight-related tasks. For example, if
ATC requested a climb to 2,000 feet, every instance the PNF verbalized a reference to the
aircraft’s altitude to the PF would be recorded. For example, this would include PNF callouts
such as “climbing through 1,000 feet for 2,000,” “300 feet to go,” or “approaching level off
altitude.” Callouts that were not counted would include those that occurred within 50 feet of
level off in cases which the PF had already significantly slowed the climb or descent and the
PNF seemed to be helping the PF to fine tune the level off altitude (vice providing an altitude
alert callout). Also, a standard call (callout) is required by the PNF upon reaching the lowest
altitude of an approach announcing to the PF whether to continue or abort the approach. This
call was not tallied as an altitude callout for the callout ratio measure.
After initial review of the simulator data, the raters agreed on 95% (580 of 611) of their
callout ratio tallies. The raters re-watched all of the callouts in dispute and were able to come to
100% agreement, and these revised tallies were used to make the above comparisons.
Task success rate. Task success rate was measured by reporting the two-person teams’
overall success rate at leveling off at assigned altitudes and at making on-time decisions at the
bottom of approach descents. This measure was unique in that while the previous two
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measurements were voluntary (i.e., callouts were not required per USCG or other flight
doctrine), this measure reported compliance with a mandatory USCG operational procedure.
The requirements for crews to meet the “success” criteria during climb tasks and descent tasks
were different. All descent tasks-of-interest were already integrated into formal instrument
approach procedures at an airport, meaning the crews flying the approach would first descend to
a certain altitude then make a decision at that point whether to continue to land (if the pilots have
obtained certain visual references with the airport) or to abort the approach. As the aircraft
reaches this altitude, depending on what the PNF sees, the PNF calls out a command to either
abort the approach (a “missed approach”) or to continue the descent to land (by saying
“continue”). To account for this, the raters rated approaches (descents) as successful if: (a) the
PNF made the appropriate callout within ± 50 feet of the target altitude, and (b) the PF did not
descend more than 50 feet beyond the target altitude if the callout required a missed approach
(i.e., aborted approach).
Measuring success at the climb tasks used much more straightforward criterion – raters
scored these as successful if the PF did not extend the climb more than 50 feet beyond the target
altitude. Given the graded nature of the simulated event and the pilot experience levels,
substantial altitude exceedences (called “busts”) were highly unlikely. In terms of federal
regulations, FAR 91.123 is the most tolerant aviation standard in stating that an altitude violation
does not occur until an aircraft is ±300 feet of an assigned altitude (Compliance with ATC
Clearances and Instructions, 1995). The FAA’s practical test standard for an instrument rating,
however, requires that pilots stay within ±100 feet of all assigned altitudes (FAA, 2004c). With
this in mind, the researchers decided a 50-foot tolerance would more effectively differentiate
between teams’ performance at these tasks.
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For each scenario, the researchers again evaluated task success on four climbs and four
approaches, for a total of 16 tasks for the two scenarios combined. For each two-person team,
the researchers recorded a single percentage score representing the number of successful tasks
divided by the total number of tasks.
Overshoot. For each of the 16 tasks, the researchers recorded the number of feet the
pilots extended the climb or descent beyond the target altitude. This measure was designed to
identify if teams in the trained group were more conscious of not flying beyond the target
altitude than the teams in the control group. These overshoots were recorded after each of the
tasks-of-interest, then averaged across the total number of tasks the crew performed (max of 16).
Overshoots were recorded in increments of five feet according to the CAD display of an analog
gauge cockpit altimeter. The total number of tasks-of-interest for the overshoot measure did not
include any approach descents in which the aircrew did not have to arrest its descent as they
continued to the runway. For example, if the aircrew was supposed to descend to 300 feet for the
approach, but the weather was clear once the aircraft descended through 600 feet, the aircrew
would most likely elect to continue the descent to the runway without pausing to level the
aircraft off at 300 feet. This event would not have been included in the overshoot measure.
Fortunately, the way the IFR scenarios were scripted, each team of participants (i.e., aircrew)
would experience the same weather at the bottom of each approach, so typically four of the eight
total approaches would not include a requirement to level off. Only one rater was used to record
this measure, as the aircraft’s altitude gauge was easy to read and the measure was considered
straightforward.
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Table 8
Tasks-of-interest
IFR Scenario 1
Task 1.1 – ATC instructs climb to 2,000’
Task 1.2 – PAR approach requires descent to 250’
Task 1.3 – ATC instructs climb to 4,000’
Task 1.4 – NDB approach requires descent to 480’
Task 1.5 – ATC instructs climb to 2,000’
Task 1.6 – VOR approach requires descent to 460’
Task 1.7 – ATC instructs climb to 2,000’
Task 1.8 – ILS approach requires descent to 270’
IFR Scenario 2
Task 2.1 – ATC instructs climb to 3,000’
Task 2.2 – ILS approach requires descent to 560’
Task 2.3 – ATC instructs climb to 2,400’
Task 2.4 – NDB approach requires descent to 1020’
Task 2.5 – ATC instructs climb to 2,400’
Task 2.6 – VOR approach requires descent to 820’
Task 2.7 – ATC instructs climb to 2,000’
Task 2.8 – PAR approach requires descent to 426’
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Results
Reaction Outcomes
Between-group differences were first examined with respect to the participants’
reactions, i.e., self-ratings, of the usefulness and overall impact of the training activity (Table 9).
On average, trained participants reacted to the training activity more positively (M = 4.04) than
the control group (M = 3.17). According to a Mann-Whitney test, this difference was significant,
U = 117.5, z = -4.40, p < .001, and represented a large-size effect, r = -.59.
Further, participants self-rated their knowledge of monitoring concepts both before and
after the training (or control) activity on a scale from 1 (low) to 5 (high). Nearly identical results
were found between the groups in their ratings of their own monitoring knowledge before the
training activity (means of 3.30 and 3.28 for the control and trained groups, respectively). A
Mann-Whitney test confirmed the pre-training knowledge scores were not significantly different,
U = 359, z = -.29, p = .77. The post-training knowledge scores, however, did vary to a larger
extent (mean score of 3.53 for the control group compared to 4.36 for the trained group), and a
Mann-Whitney test confirmed the post-training difference was significant, U = 180, z = -3.67, p
< .01. To explore these pre- versus post-training differences, two distinct analyses were
performed. First, a Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test was run to compare the before and after
conditions within each group. For the control group, participants’ self-ratings of monitoring
knowledge were significantly higher after the control activity (M = 3.53) than before the activity
(M = 3.30), z = -2.33, p = .02. Additionally, for the trained group, self-ratings of monitoring
knowledge were significantly higher after the training activity (M = 4.36) than before (M = 3.28),
z = -4.09, p < .001. A Wilcoxon’s test indicated that the effect size was medium (r = -.43) for
the control activity, but much larger (r = -.82) for the trained group. To explore this difference
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further, a measure of change in monitoring knowledge was developed by subtracting each
participant’s “before” knowledge rating from their “after” knowledge rating. The average
perceived increase in knowledge was greater in the training group (M = +1.08, SD = 0.76) than
the control group (M = +0.23, SD = 0.50). This difference represented a significantly greater
increase in perceived learning among participants completing the online training group compared
to those who completed the control activity, U = 141.5, z = -4.38, p < .001, r = -.59, and the
effect size was large, (because r > .5, per Cohen’s benchmarks, 1988).
Participants in the trained group responded to three additional questions pertaining to the
quality of content and delivery of the online training program. The participants’ responses
ranged from 3 to 5 (again on a scale from 1 [low] to 5 [high]) and the average score across these
three questions was very high (M = 4.53). Open-ended, written questionnaire feedback from the
trained group included positive comments including: “that was one of the best put-together
surveys I’ve seen in a long time,” and “I recommend all pilots take this survey to heighten their
[monitoring] awareness in different regimes of flight.” Feedback from the control group
included the comments: “survey addresses a very valid topic” and “would make for a good pilot
training session.”
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Table 9
Post-training Reaction Scores
Condition
Control (n = 30)

Experimental (n = 25)

Composite reactions score, from 1 (low) to 5 (high)

3.17 (.81)

4.04 (.44)**

Self-rating of monitoring knowledge before training

3.30

3.28

Self-rating of monitoring knowledge after training

3.53*

4.36*

+0.23 (.50)

+1.08 (.76)**

--

4.53 (.55)

Reported change in monitoring knowledge
Reported utility of online training, from 1 to 5
Note: Means are shown with standard deviations in parentheses.
* indicates a significant difference (p < .05) from before training score.
** indicates a significant difference (p < .001) from control score.

Learning Outcomes
Fifty-five participants (25 trained and 30 control) completed the post-training 10-item
multiple-choice test. Tests were then scored from 0 to 100%. On average, trained participants
scored higher (M = 92.8%) on the exam than the control group (M = 47.7%). Test scores ranged
from 60% to 100% in the trained group and from 20% to 70% in the control group. All but four
of the trained participants scored either a 90 or 100% on the test. Both the distributions of the
test scores for trained participants, D(25) = 0.29, p < .05, and the control participants, D(30) =
0.18, p < .05, were significantly non-normal. Therefore, a Mann-Whitney test was used to
determine if the difference in test scores was significant. This difference was indeed significant,
U = 6.5, z = -6.31, p < .001, r = -.85 (see Table 10).
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Table 10
Post-training Test Results
Condition
Post-training test score (0 to 100 percent)

Control (n = 30)

Experimental (n = 25)

47.7 (13.3)

92.8* (9.80)

Note: Means are shown with standard deviations in parentheses.
* indicates a significant difference (p < .001) from control scores.

Behavior Outcomes
As discussed in the methods section, the 44 participants were paired into teams of two
and evaluated as 22 teams for the simulator portion of the study. Once assigned to their training
conditions, there were 11 trained teams and 11 control teams which the two raters (researchers)
rated on their performance in the flight simulator. Before analyzing the potential significance of
the individual dependent measures, a one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANCOVA,
between-subjects factor: group [trained, control]; covariate: experience [junior pilot aboard, no
junior pilot aboard]) was first performed to determine whether there was a significant effect of
training condition across four dependent variables: 5-2-1 compliance, callout ratio, task success,
and altitude overshoot. According to Hotelling’s trace statistic, there was a significant effect of
training group on these four outcomes, T = 2.09, F(4, 16) = 8.34, p < .01. We also confirmed
that the covariate, experience, was not significantly related to the same four outcomes, T = .23,
F(4, 16) = .92, p = .98.
5-2-1 rule compliance. The next step we took was to follow up the significant
MANCOVA with univariate analyses. Looking first at the 5-2-1 rule dependent variable, teams
in the training group made more 5-2-1 callouts (M = 43%, SD = 12.9%) during the last 1,000 feet
of climbs and descents than teams in the control group (M = 17.5%, SD = 4.6%). The range for
teams’ 5-2-1 callout usage in the training group was from 27% to 65% and the range for 5-2-1

59

callout usage in the control groups was from 11% to 26%. The researchers applied a one-way
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the 5-2-1 variable. The ANOVA revealed a significant effect
of training on 5-2-1 compliance, F(1, 19) = 37.8, MSE = .37, p < .001, ηp2 = .67, which
supported our hypothesis. The 5-2-1 usage scores did violate Levene’s test for equality of
variance, however the t-test is considered robust to violations of homogeneity of variance when
sample sizes are equal (Levene, 1960).
Callout ratio. The ratio of callouts the PNFs voluntarily made in the simulator ranged
from 0.55 to 1.40 callouts per minute for the control group and 0.85 to 1.93 per minute for the
trained group. On average, PNFs in the trained group made more callouts per minute (M = 1.38)
than PNFs in the control group (M = 0.86). As a follow-up to the significant MANCOVA, the
callout ratio measure was also examined using an ANOVA. This analysis revealed a significant
effect of training condition on callout ratio, F(1, 19) = 17.14, p = .001, MSE = 1.52, ηp2 = .47,
and the hypothesis was supported (see Table 12).
A Pearson correlation analysis across the four in-flight variables was also conducted.
With regard to the two “behavior” measures, it was found that 5-2-1 rule use and callout ratio
were significantly correlated, Pearson’s r(22) = .86, p < .001. This indicated that teams who
made more 5-2-1 callouts would be more likely to have higher callout ratios, an expected finding
as there were common elements among these two variables. A list of the correlation coefficients
is presented in Table 11.
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Table 11
Correlations between Four In-flight Variables (N = 22)
Behavior Outcomes

5-2-1 Rule Use
Callout Ratio
Task Success Rate

Task Outcomes

5-2-1 Rule Use

Callout Ratio

Task Success rate

-

.857**
-

.243
.503*
-

Altitude
Overshoot
.026
-.222
-.560**

Note: Pearson’s r values are listed.
*p < .05. **p < .01

Task Outcomes
The 11 trained teams completed between 80% and 100% of tasks successfully, with a
mean success rate of 92.4%. The 11 control (untrained) teams completed between 75% and
100% of tasks successfully with a mean success rate of 89.7%. An ANOVA was performed
which revealed a non-significant effect of training condition on task success, F(1, 19) = .54, p =
.47, and the hypothesis was not supported. To analyze an alternative measure of level-off task
success, the researchers examined the effect of the training condition on the magnitude of the
teams’ altitude overshoots at level-off tasks. Although no overshoot may be ideal, in the real
world, any overshoot less than 100 feet on any non-approach related vertical maneuver would
not generally be cause for concern. The control group exceeded the target altitude on 66.7% of
the tasks and averaged 17.7 feet of overshoot on the tasks overall. The trained group also
exceeded the target altitude on 66.7% of the tasks but overshot by a slightly greater margin of
19.3 feet across all tasks. An ANOVA was performed and revealed a non-significant effect of
training condition on magnitude of altitude overshoot, F(1, 19) = .26, p = .62, and the hypothesis
was not supported. There were only 16 altitude level-off exceedences greater than 50 feet,
which equated to 6.7% of all 241 tasks requiring a level-off. There were four altitude
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exceedences greater than 100 feet (1.7% of tasks). The largest overshoot on a single task was
155 feet in the trained group and 130 feet in the control group.
With respect to the “tasks” measures, altitude overshoot and task success rate were found
to be significantly correlated, r(22) = -.56, p < .01. This indicated that two-pilot teams who
committed larger altitude deviations during level-offs would be less likely to succeed on the
level-off tasks, an expected finding as there were common elements among these two variables.
A significant correlation was also found between a “behavior” and a “task” category variable –
callout ratio and task success rate were significantly correlated, r(22) = .50, p < .05. This
indicated that teams who made more callouts-per-minute would be more likely to succeed on the
level-off task. None of the other simple linear correlations were significant (see Table 11).
Table 12
Monitoring Outcomes in Flight
Condition
Control (n = 11)

Experimental (n = 11)

5-2-1 Rule Use (percentage)

17.6 (4.61)

43.3* (13.0)

Callout Ratio (per minute)

0.86 (0.26)

1.38* (0.32)

Task Success Rate (percentage)

89.7 (8.62)

92.4 (7.62)

Altitude Overshoot (feet)

17.7 (6.84)

19.3 (8.14)

Note: Means are shown with standard deviations in parentheses.
* indicates a significant difference (p < .05) from control scores.

Pilot Experience
A team containing a pilot designated either a copilot (CP) or first pilot (FP) was
considered a less experienced team and a team not containing a CP or FP was considered a more
experienced team. In this study, there were 11 teams which contained a junior pilot and 11
teams which did not. The teams with a junior pilot made 5-2-1 callouts at a nearly identical rate
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(M = 30.4%) than teams without a junior pilot (M = 30.6%). Examining the callout ratio
measure, teams with junior pilots (M = 1.11) were virtually equivalent to teams without junior
pilots (M = 1.12). Similar results were found in the task success rate and overshoot measures
(Table 12). Using a MANCOVA with training group as the independent variable confirmed that
the covariate, experience, was not significantly related to simulator behaviors, T = .23, F(4, 16) =
.92, p > .05. Because this omnibus test failed to reach significance, this test was not followed up
with separate ANCOVAs or t-tests.
Table 13
Callouts by Pilot Experience
Condition
Junior pilot on team
(n = 11)

No junior pilot on team
(n = 11)

5-2-1 Rule Use

30.4 (14.3)

30.6 (18.7)

Callout Ratio (per minute)

1.12 (0.29)

1.11 (0.49)

Task Success (percentage)

91.3 (7.69)

90.7 (8.77)

Altitude Overshoot (feet)

18.3 (7.17)

18.7 (7.94)

Note: Means are shown with standard deviations in parentheses.

Attitudes Questionnaire
Table 12 shows the participants’ responses to each of the 23 questions included in the last
section of the questionnaire. Significant differences between groups was rare, which indicated
the two groups were generally similar in terms of (a) how they prioritized monitoring among
other non-flying pilot responsibilities, (b) what indications they felt were most important to
monitor, and (c) when during the flight it was most important to actively monitor. A final
question asked the participants to evaluate the need for mandating a critical altitude at which
time both pilots should be exclusively monitoring the instruments during a climb or descent.
There was a significant difference between the groups as 43% of control participants felt there
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was no need for such a guideline while only 8% of trained participants felt the same way (χ2 (3,
N = 55) = 8.78, p < .05). The majority of this difference was accounted for in one of the other
three responses that stated setting an ‘[exact] number of feet would be appropriate.’ Forty
percent of the trained participants chose this answer while only 23% of the control participants
did (see Figure 4).
Table 14
Attitudes Questionnaire Results

As PNF, rate the importance of…
Completing checklists?
Radio communications?
Operating the flight director (autopilot)?
Monitoring the actions of the other pilot?
Monitoring the status of aircraft systems?
Monitoring the aircraft’s flight path?
Conducting briefings?
As PNF, rate importance of monitoring each
instrument in actual IMC…
BarAlt (Barometric Altimeter)
RadAlt (Radio Altimeter)
Airspeed Indicator
Heading
FMS Modes
ADI (Attitude Direction Indicator)
VSI (Vertical Speed Indicator)
As PNF, rate importance of monitoring during
each flight regime…
Pre-takeoff/taxi:
Takeoff:
Enroute to destination/operational area:
Approach to landing:
Approach to overwater hover:
Landing:
Hover operations:
As PNF, how vigilant are you when autopilot is
engaged?

Overall
(N = 55)

Trained
(n = 25)

Control
(n = 30)

6.1
5.5
5.2
6.6
6.1
4.9
6.5

6.0
5.3
5.0
6.7
6.1
4.8
6.5

6.1
5.7
5.3
6.5
6.1
4.9
6.5

6.4
4.8
6.0
6.2
5.1
6.4
6.2

6.2
5.0
5.8
5.9*
4.8*
6.5
6.3

6.6
4.6
6.2
6.4
5.4
6.4
6.0

5.1
6.6
5.4
6.6
6.9
6.4
6.5

5.0
6.6
4.9**
6.6
7.0
6.3
6.3

5.1
6.7
5.7
6.5
6.9
6.4
6.6

3.9

4.1

3.8

Note: Mean scores are shown. Items were rated on a scale from no importance (1) to extremely important (7).
* indicates a significant difference (p < .05) from control scores.
** indicates a significant difference (p < .01) from control scores.
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Percentage of Respondents

50
40
30
Control (n = 30)

20

Trained (n = 25)
10
0
No guideline
needed

Yes, should vary
based on regime

Yes, should vary
proportional to
altitude

Yes, an exact
number of feet is
appropriate

Figure 4. Participant Attitudes towards Mandatory Monitoring Altitudes
Training Latency Analysis
The time interval between participants completing the training and flying the simulator
varied from an hour to three full days (1.0 to 72.5 hours), and the average time from training to
simulator was about a day and a half (M = 39.4; SD = 27.1). The interval between the training
and the first simulator flight was averaged for each of the two-pilot teams (in the trained group
only) and a simple linear regression was run for each of the behavior variables to see if
performance decayed as training latency increased. Training latency was used as the predictor
variable and 5-2-1 rule usage as the outcome variable in the first analysis. Training latency was
not a significant predictor of 5-2-1 compliance, F(1, 9) = 4.58, p = .061, although this result did
approach significance. Similar results were found for the second simple regression. Training
latency was used as the predictor variable and callout ratio as the outcome variable, and training
latency was also not found to be a significant predictor of callout ratio, F(1, 9) = 4.83, p = .056.
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Discussion
Overview
Our modern understanding of aircraft mishaps has grown to appreciate that shortcomings
in pilots’ technical flying skills are rarely the cause of accidents – errors of communication and
team coordination are the more likely culprits (Gladwell, 2008, p.186). The two-pilot flight deck
environment is one in which the flying responsibilities must be strategically shared to enable the
crew to perform well as a team. One issue that researchers believe deserves more attention is the
pilots’ role to cross-check each other’s actions as a defense against preventable errors (Sumwalt
et al., 1997, 2002; Dismukes & Berman, 2010). The current study examined the effectiveness of
an online training program specifically designed to strengthen pilots’ voluntary monitoring
behaviors during climbs and descents. The participants were instrument-rated helicopter pilots
and represented a cross-section of experience levels and geographic locations. The researchers
measured changes in participants’ knowledge and flight behaviors across all four dimensions of
Kirkpatrick’s (1976) training evaluation framework as they pertained to pilot monitoring
behaviors. The results indicate that a brief online training tool can teach pilots to be more
proactive monitors of aircraft altitude during critical flight regimes.
Hypotheses 1-2
Participants in the training group provided highly favorable ratings of the training. In
fact, only three participants rated any aspect of the training below a four on a one (1) to five (5)
scale, with five, the highest score, being the most frequent response to all questions. Ratings of
the online training by the trained group were significantly greater than those rating the control
activity, suggesting that the participants thought the training was worthwhile and applicable to
their jobs. A second measure of participants’ reactions – a comparison of the participants’ self-
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assessed improvement in knowledge of the subject matter – also rose appreciably in the trained
group.
When the researchers tested the participants’ knowledge of the training program’s
learning objectives, the participants in the training group scored extremely well and significantly
better than the control group. There are three reasons having these quantifiable results are
important. First, the assumption that a training need did exist was validated: the control group’s
significantly lower test scores were a clear indicator that pilots did not have pre-existing
knowledge of the training material. Second, the trained groups’ results validated that the test
questions were closely correlated to the training content. The consistently high scores (and lack
of outliers) among the trained participants indicate this group paid attention to the training and
were able to recall information from the training to answer the test questions. Third, these results
support the principles behind the cognitive load theory. Given the learners’ consistently
successful retention of the training material, the efforts to reduce extraneous workload and to
increase germane factors on the learners’ cognitive processes worked to promote learning of the
course objectives. The remaining hypotheses built on these results by testing to see whether the
pilots would apply what they had learned in the flight environment.
Hypotheses 3-4
The behavior measures taken from flight simulator recordings also indicate the online
training was effective. The scripted flight simulator events allowed for a standardized and
informative performance comparison – flight conditions in the simulator (weather and types of
emergencies encountered, approaches flown, airports used) were controlled and kept relatively
equivalent. The first measure examined the teams’ use of the 5-2-1 rule. The measure was
developed to see if pilots who were taught a simple memory tool to promote altitude monitoring
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would apply it in the flight environment. The 5-2-1 rule was the focal point of the training – it
was first explained in the online training session, then participants were given an opportunity to
practice it with the assistance of computer-based feedback, if needed. Never did the training
program, researchers, or instructors explicitly state that these callouts were required. The rule
was presented only as a suggestion to help the pilots fly more safely. Still, performance
differences indicated that trained pilots used the 5-2-1 callouts at a significantly higher rate than
the control group. This is significant for two reasons: (a) at a conscious level, pilots felt the rule
was beneficial to apply in flight, and (b) that pilots considered 500, 200, and 100 feet to be
appropriate points during these maneuvers to apply the rule. If either assumption was not true, it
is unlikely the pilots would have applied the rule at all in the in-flight (simulator) setting. The
statistical predicament in the pilots’ use of the 5-2-1 rule as a variable was that the same callouts
factored into the crews’ overall callout ratios (i.e., second in-flight dependent measure), making
the measures almost too highly correlated to warrant the distinction. The data showing a strong
positive correlation between 5-2-1 compliance and callout ratio (r2 = .73) was hardly surprising
in light of the fact that the 5-2-1 callouts counted towards callout ratios. The two measures were
both included from the perspective that (a) these performance measures were highly heuristic
given the exploratory nature of the training program, and (b) if the measures did not correlate,
this would have had significant implications on the fundamental training design we used. For
example, if there were significant differences in 5-2-1 rule usage but non-significant differences
in callout ratios, this might have indicated that pilots were already being proactive with altitude
callouts, just not in accordance with our specifically-trained 5-2-1 criteria. The researcher’s
intent, from the flying behavior perspective, was that the rule would both provide structure to the
non-flying pilots’ duties and increase altitude monitoring during vertical flight regimes.

68

Broadening the scope of observations, PNF-initiated altitude callouts during the last
1,000 feet of climbs and descents were examined. The online training taught pilots that
commercial aviation SOPs require that all non-essential tasks to be suspended within 1,000 feet
of any level-off as a counter to the risk of making a level-off error while multi-tasking – in other
words, to maintain a “sterile cockpit.” This meant two training “forces” were potentially at
work in the trained participants’ minds: (a) the sterile cockpit mentality below 1,000 feet, and (b)
the 5-2-1 rule. Neither the USCG’s existing SOPs nor flight operations manuals require that
pilots make intermediate callouts at specific altitudes during climbs and descents. The altitude
“callout ratio” measure was important to test whether the participants gave verbal indications
that they were actively watching the aircraft’s altitude during climbs and descents. For example,
an untrained pilot making callouts at 1000, 600, 400, and 200 feet prior to level off would score
higher than a trained pilot who ignores callouts until 500 feet and then completes all three 5-2-1
calls. In other words, if the callout ratios had not differed between experimental groups, it may
have indicated the strategy of using randomly arranged callouts was an equal or more effective
method of altitude monitoring than 5-2-1 rule, rendering the 5-2-1 rule unnecessary. The number
of voluntary callouts participants made per minute, however, did increase in the trained group.
This confirms the hypothesis regarding the effect the online training had on aircrews’ callout
ratios and strengthens the overall effect the training seemed to have. Without conducting a
separate experiment to tally the locations where (number of feet prior to level off) pilots’ made
altitude callouts during climbs and descents, it is impossible to say if the significant differences
in callout ratio were only an effect of the 5-2-1 rule training or indicative of something that had
transferred from the general training emphasis on altitude awareness, i.e., one which had an
effect on pilots’ behaviors even before they reached the 500-feet-prior point. As one participant
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reported, “I had never thought of using specific altitudes… I normally just make random
callouts.”
Responses to one of the survey questions shed some light on reasons for the group
differences. When the participants were asked how many callouts they would make during the
last 500 feet of a climb or descent, participants in the control group, on average, suggested they
would make 2.5 callouts (n = 30). By comparison, the trained participants exclusively reported
they would make three callouts during the final 500 feet (note: this was consistent with the 5-2-1
rule contained within the training and was unlikely a pre-existing difference). This further
confirms that after receiving training, the non-flying pilots were mentally prepared to make more
frequent altitude callouts during the final few hundred feet prior to level off.
There were other indications that pilots’ altitude monitoring did extend beyond tacit
acceptance of the first 500 foot callout recommended by the 5-2-1 rule. Were trained crews
actually putting other tasks on hold during the final stages of vertical phases of flight, freeing
mental capacity for focusing their attention on monitoring altitude and other instruments during
the level-off task? Observations indicated a small percentage of crews (two of the trained teams)
explicitly state they were putting all other cockpit tasks on hold during the entire 1,000 foot
window, as the airlines already do. From an aviation safety perspective, it was a positive sign to
hear aircrews who had received the training explicitly state they were putting the checklists on
hold at the 1,000 feet-to-go point of a climb until the level-off task was accomplished. A
comment like this suggests that the behavioral transfer of the training material, at least in some
cases, extended beyond the simple application of the 5-2-1 rule.
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Hypothesis 5
Contrary to this hypothesis, no statistically significant support was found to indicate the
online training affected teams’ bottom-line flight task outcomes. Task success was looked at as a
measure to see if the users of this online training would change their cross-checking behaviors to
such an extent they achieved a higher level of proficiency at vertical flight tasks. This was not
the case, as teams in both groups demonstrated similar proficiency at following procedures and
backing up the flying pilots as the aircraft leveled off. There was one major hindrance to the
online training having an effect on this outcome, and it came from using a particularly motivated
group of participants for this study. Going into each IFR simulator event, the pilots knew they
were receiving their annual graded instrument flight proficiency check ride. These check flights
held a high level of personal and professional significance to the pilots, and as a result, the
participants would have been highly motivated. Pilots typically study and prepare for several
days (or longer) for this flight. If a participant was to fail this flight, there would be negative and
professionally embarrassing consequences. Further, the approach tasks-of-interest themselves
were of significant importance to passing these flights – it is a basic aviation tenet not to descend
below a minimum descent altitude unless the airport is in sight. The “results” measures that
were used, unlike the previous “behavior” measures (Kirkpatrick, 1976), were ones which the
USCG instructors were also evaluating the participants on, and the participants knew this.
Results from the altitude overshoot measure were also non-significant, and did not
support the hypothesis. Although this was not what was hypothesized, the measure of overshoot
was an interesting one as some techniques were discovered which pilots used to level off. In
particular, it was found that pilots preferred using automation to level off the aircraft whenever
possible. The overshoot measure became more a function of which one of three different
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techniques the pilots used to level-off the aircraft than a measure of the focus the pilots were
directing at the altimeter readings just prior to leveling off. Using the first level-off technique,
a.k.a. the ‘hand fly’ method, pilots would manually fly the aircraft during the climb or descent,
slow the rate of climb or descent as they approached the level off altitude, and zero out the
vertical speed as they arrived at the target altitude. This technique was mostly observed in
simulator events in instances when the autopilot was made inoperative (for training) by the
instructor. Survey data shows participants were hesitant to manually fly the simulator and more
reliant on the autopilot than they would have been in the actual aircraft. The second and third
techniques involved using the autopilot (automation) during the entire climb or descent and
level-off. The difference between the second and third techniques was a measure of the
dependence the PF placed in automation to do its job. Using one technique (one more often used
in climbs), pilots would keep the rate-of-climb or rate-of-descent established for the entire
vertical maneuver and then call for the PNF to engage the altitude hold mode as they passed the
target altitude. During a climb for example, this technique would mean the autopilot would
capture while the aircraft was still climbing. Since the computer captures the target altitude at
the moment the button is depressed, the autopilot computer would need 25 to 50 feet to arrest the
aircraft’s climb before it began to descend back down to the proper altitude. Using an alternative
autopilot method, pilots would use the autopilot to slow the rate of climb or descent (usually
about 100 to 200 feet prior to level off) and make a more controlled and gradual approach to the
target altitude. Using this method, the PF would have slowed the climb or descent to less than
200 feet-per-minute (fpm) before having the PNF engage the “altitude hold” autopilot mode.
This technique was more common to see pilots using during approaches and descents. Because
about half of the teams used the former autopilot method (to accept a 25 to 50 foot overshoot as
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part of allowing the autopilot to handle the level off), the overshoot measure data tended to be a
representation of this technique. In fact, the strong and significant negative correlation between
overshoot and the task success rate (r2 = .31) confirmed this – as the teams’ average overshoot
variable increased, their task success rates decreased. This result was anticipated and attributed
largely to the fact that overshoots greater than 50 feet were counted as single-task failures in the
teams’ overall task success rate score. Ultimately, neither of these “task outcomes” measures
was able to identify an effect on the teams’ bottom line performance at vertical flight maneuvers
in the flight simulator.
The correlation analysis provided some encouraging results. The moderate-to-strong
correlation between callout ratio and task success rate (r2 = .25) meant that the teams (regardless
of group membership) making more callouts during in-flight tasks were also more successful at
the level-off tasks. This is an important finding in light of the prior discovery of a significant
main effect of the online training on teams’ callout ratios. This is a subtle indication that there
may be a link between online training (independent variable) and task success (outcome
variable), and the only tangible evidence of a training effect at the organizational (i.e.,
Kirkpatrick’s “results”) level. This is an important finding from the perspective of developing
content validity for these types of measures as good, valid measures of “monitoring skills”. Had
the tasks not been completed by considerably experienced and proficient pilots flying a scripted
check-flight, the result might have increased our chance of detecting a difference between the
training groups with regard to their task success rates.
Hypothesis 6. It was expected that teams with junior pilots would make fewer callouts
than teams with senior pilots, however, this hypothesis was not upheld. Previous research
indicates that junior pilots tend not to be as assertive as senior pilots (Jentsch et al., 1997) and
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that crew pairings containing senior pilots paired with very junior pilots are involved in more
mishaps (NTSB, 1994). These were indirect indications that monitoring skills may improve with
pilot experience. In this study, crew performance was measured in pairs of pilots and, therefore
were unable to distinguish between the callouts made by each pilot on an individual basis. In
other words, within a team’s total callout ratio, it is impossible to know which pilot, if either,
made more callouts. These performance indications were relatively identical across the four
dependent measures regardless of pilot experience level, and none even approached significance.
Because individual data was not gathered on junior pilots, the only conclusion that can be drawn
from this measure is that the data did not give any preliminary indications that there is an effect
of experience on monitoring performance. From a training design perspective, it is a positive
sign that junior and senior pilots have similar baselines monitoring performance levels and seem
to be similarly receptive to the training. Still, the scope of this comparison in terms of overall
pilot monitoring was very narrow (altitude callouts only) and did not relate to monitoring for
deviations, which is the primary area of concern regarding the monitoring performance of junior
pilots. Future studies would benefit from finding better ways to control for pilot experience in
order to draw more statistically useful comparisons.
Helicopter “Areas of Vulnerability”
In the background section, the author described that industry analysts had developed an
“areas of vulnerability” (AOV) diagram used to depict to pilots the highest workload flight
regimes to help pilots’ awareness of error vulnerability (Sumwalt et al., 2002; see Figure 1). The
diagram stresses the importance of both pilots maintaining their awareness during vertical phases
of flight. The AOV diagram was written with long-haul, commercial aviation aircrews in mind.
Since this study instead used military helicopter pilots, it is worth discussing some of the
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differences in the flight regimes and the implications for aircrew errors. The first major
difference is that most helicopters stay below 10,000 feet MSL (i.e., low-altitude flight). In
commercial aviation, by comparison, all attempts are made to minimize flight time below 10,000
feet MSL, mostly because there is a much greater amount of civil aviation traffic flying at these
altitudes. Along these lines, the current AOV chart discusses “transition altitudes,” an altimeter
change procedure which only applies to aircraft flying over 18,000 feet MSL. Any mention of
flight over 10,000 feet and transition altitudes would be easy to remove in a discussion of AOV
for helicopters.
A more interesting discussion may be whether “1,000 feet prior to any level off” is an
appropriate area of vulnerability in helicopter IFR operations. After all, helicopters typically
operate at lower altitudes, make much smaller magnitude altitude adjustments, and use smaller
vertical speeds (±1,000 fpm) to maneuver vertically. To adhere to a typical 3 degree approach
glideslope, a helicopter would not typically exceed a 600 fpm rate-of-descent. A commercial jet,
by comparison, routinely exceeds 3,000 fpm for enroute climbs and descents, a number that
decreases to around 1,000 to 1,500 fpm during approach descents. So the task of monitoring a
commercial jet’s altitude may take as little as 15 to 20 during the last 1,000 feet of a climb
seconds and as much as 60 seconds during an approach descent. According to the helicopter
simulator data from this study, 1,000 foot climbs in the helicopter simulator took just over one
minute to complete on average and the same 1,000 foot approach descent typically took crews
over two minutes. The questionnaire in this study asked participants if there was a specific
altitude prior to level off that would be an ideal time for both pilots to focus on the level off task.
Among those who agreed there should be a standard, 500 feet was the most frequent response,
and 82% of the responses were equal to or less than 500 feet (n = 17). Five hundred feet would
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equate to 30 seconds of a climb and 60 seconds of an approach, much closer to the commercial
aviation standard used in the AOV chart. Accordingly, this research suggests that a more
appropriate area of vulnerability for helicopter pilots during vertical maneuvers would be within
500 feet of the assigned level-off altitude. This number is more aligned with both the survey
data from pilots and the reduced severity of risk (inherent to the slower airspeeds and lower rates
of descent) associated with helicopter IFR operations. A more thorough analysis of accident or
operational flight data would be necessary to draw any more conclusions regarding how “areas
of vulnerability” affect helicopter operations differently than commercial ones. From an
instructional perspective, it is highly worthwhile to continue to explore these differences to
improve training programs and develop aircraft-specific AOV charts.
Limitations
Although this study utilized a fairly simple experimental design, the execution and nature
of the experiment was susceptible to several limitations. Many of these limitations arose from
using real world observational data which would not have existed had we used a tightly
controlled laboratory setting. The limits of the field study can be categorized into the following
categories: selection bias, efficacy of training, missing data, and experimenter bias.
Selection bias. As in most field studies, many experimental factors were outside the
control of the experiment. For example, a preferred experimental design is to use a pre- and
post-test experimental design, not a post-test only design as was performed here. This was, as
the case with some of the other limitations, primarily a function of the access the researchers
were granted in this field study. Without having pre-test scores to compare our results to, the
central threat to the validity of this study is that a selection bias existed. In other words, what
assurance did the researchers have that our sample of trained participants were equivalent or
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comparable to the control group before the study in terms of the behaviors of interest to this
study? Selection bias states that when non-random assignment exists (e.g., pre-assigned groups
were used for this study), it is difficult for the researchers to ensure the groups are identical.
Pilot experience is considered a characteristic that may correlate significantly with the dependent
variables at play (Bordens & Abbott, 2008), which suggests that for studies using pilots as
participants is that having similar levels of flight experience within each group may actually be
preferable to a lopsided, yet random distribution of flight experience. In this case, we gathered
several measures of flight experience information from the participants to investigate these
potential types of critiques. As researchers, a decision was also made not to randomly assign
pairs to training groups, as it made more sense in the bigger picture to apply an alternating,
week-on, week-off systematic schedule to assign participants into their groups. It was felt that
alternating the groups’ treatments week-to-week reduced the chance of diffusion bias between
the groups, as would have been the case had the participants discussed the training during their
social time together. This non-random assignment method also was accepted by ensuring the
two groups did not significantly differ across several demographic variables. In fact, the groups
were very similar across demographic categories and pilot experience levels (see Tables 1 and
2).
Efficacy of online training. A major critique of any training research is that the
researchers cannot control for learners’ level of motivation. With online, asynchronous training,
it is even more difficult to ensure learners pay attention to the training program. For this study,
testing the efficacy of the training was accounted for from the earliest stages of its development.
Beyond the use of SMEs during the development phases, the content itself was designed to be
engaging by providing the trainees with feedback. It is assumed that this feedback played a role
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in the effectiveness of the training observed in the reactions, learning, and behavior outcomes.
During this study, there were no reports of software failures or confusing directions within the
program itself which would have discouraged participants from completing the training. To
further address this limitation, this study’s results show both overwhelmingly positive participant
reactions and post-training test results as quantifiable measures of the trainings’ efficacy.
Training latency. Another limitation in terms of the training’s efficacy was the variation
in the amount of elapsed time between the participant taking the training and the start of the
flight simulator events. The time interval between participants completing the training and
flying the simulator varied from an hour to three full days. The reason for the large variation in
training latency was because the USCG requested the researchers to use voluntary participants
and operate on a “low-interference” basis. In order to respect the need of students to prepare for
the normal events (tests, lectures, and check flights) during the week, the researchers made the
training available online starting the day the students arrived at the proficiency course (Sunday)
with the explanation that the training could be taken any time prior to their first scheduled
simulator event (Tuesday, and in a few cases, Wednesday). This method created a limitation, but
does suggests that the results would have more consistent and reliable if the researchers had
required participants take the training within a more restricted time period prior to the simulator
events. Had the researchers arranged for a longer period of time to accumulate data, this method
might have been feasible. The other option would have been to treat latency as another
independent variable or covariate, but the logistics of this study and small sample size here did
not allow for this. We do not assume these results tell suggest whether long-term monitoring
behaviors are impacted by this training – obviously training effects are susceptible to decay.
Future research should be expanded into longer-term studies of monitoring skill (or any other
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non-technical skill) retention. This study merely provides a starting point for studies into the
effectiveness of online, non-technical skill training programs that test the duration of the training
effect both immediately and then three, six, or 12 months after the initial training treatment.
Incomplete data. This research was conducted in a real-world military training
environment and used a high-fidelity simulator. This applied setting was a rare research
opportunity and served as a valuable setting to conduct this research – it enhanced the overall
external validity of our hypothesis which stated that online training can be an effective training
method. The flight simulator was conducive to testing representative, intact pairs of pilots in an
appropriately realistic, yet safe environment.
Unfortunately, not every group in the study could be observed across all 16 tasks-ofinterest. In one case, the recording of an event began a few minutes late (when the instructor
remembered to turn on the recording device). In another case, the recording ended early because
the maximum recording length for an event was exceeded. This happened because an instructor
did not stop and reset the CAD recording system between two separate events. The other form
of missing data would occur if either an aircrew aborted an approach for some legitimate reason
(e.g., an emergency situation) or an instructor (to increase workload and test pilot decision
making for training purposes) changed an altitude assignment task in the middle of a climb. In
these cases, the researchers changed the appropriate denominators in the 5-2-1 callouts, task
success, and overshoot measures to reflect the missing data. For callout ratio, the total number
of seconds providing callout “opportunities” would have been slightly less for the teams over the
two events if an event was missed. In cases where the crew was, within a few hundred feet of
leveling off when the task was changed or aborted, the data up to that point was used. For
example, if the in-flight task changed from a climb to a descent but the pilots were already within
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150 feet of leveling off from the climb, the clock would stop, and callouts would be averaged
over the time it took the aircraft to climb from 1,000 feet prior to 150 feet prior to level off.
Also, only the opportunities for 500 and 200 foot prior callout would be used and the team would
get a 5-2-1 score for that task out of two instead of three. One team included in this study
completed 13 tasks, one team completed 14 tasks, and five teams completed 15 tasks. None of
the teams used in the final results completed less than 13 total tasks.
Instruction differences. Another limit of the study is that each simulator event is an
actual training event and there were inconsistencies in the workload imposed by instructor that
were outside the control of the experiment. Instructors do follow a script, but are empowered to
insert simulated emergencies or other distractions at random points throughout the flight to test
the pilots. This would add to the workload at certain points for the crew and may confound
results of the crews’ monitoring performance. For example, if an instructor activated an engine
fire warning light as the aircraft approached a level-off point, the crew would be less engaged
(justifiably) in the monitoring task. Another method of instructor inference affecting pilot
workload would be for the instructor pilot to discuss the participants’ performance on a previous
task during the subsequent tasks, potentially affecting the participants’ performance ratings on
the next task. Still, one could argue that this lack of experimental control actually promoted the
accrual of more realistic monitoring performance data within a wide range of environments.
Experimenter/measurement bias. Despite having planned for and developed a
straightforward measurement procedure, the researchers knew two raters would be required to
observe the tasks-of-interest and ensure the callout tallies were consistent. Also, to ensure they
were kept impartial, the raters were kept blind to the condition they were watching. The use of
two raters was beneficial and allowed the SME raters to identify ambiguous moments and come
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to agreement. When watching and listening to the recordings, however, there were several
instances where radio calls would be “stepped on,” other instances where it would be very
difficult to tell which pilot had made the callout, or what exactly they said with a high level of
certainty. An example would be a pilot saying, “one hundred,” and the rater having to listen to
context at that point in the recording to determine if the pilot meant 100 feet, 100 degrees of
heading, or 100 knots. A final issue was that some pilots would specifically mention the 5-2-1
calls leading up to a level-off, which clearly identified that team as belonging to the trained
group and opening up the researchers to potential for experimenter bias.
Conclusion
In recent years, researchers have suggested there is a need for non-technical aviation
training that is “effective, standardized, widely distributable, and affordable” (Kearns, 2010).
The challenge for training pilot monitoring and cross-checking skills is two-fold in that (a) these
programs still lack attention within the industry, and (b) researchers have not explored which
delivery methods – online, classroom, or blended; asynchronous or synchronous – would be
most suitable for pilot training. The current study tested the efficacy of a relatively brief,
inexpensive training program on one aspect of monitoring (a non-technical flight skill): the 5-2-1
rule. The evaluation included trainee reactions, knowledge, behavior, and task outcomes.
Training effects were evident in the first three levels and not the fourth. We can therefore infer
that just because we did not see changes at the results level does not necessarily mean that the
training did not affect the “results” level, i.e., the organization’s bottom line. Future research
into monitoring and other non-technical skill training programs should continue to seek unique
and improved ways to measure results.
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Despite the lack of results indicating a change in the task outcome measures, the other
results were very promising. This study successfully showed a positive transfer of pilot
behaviors from an online training program to an operational environment. According to D. L.
and J. D. Kirkpatrick (2006), for change to happen a learner must: (a) desire to change, (b) know
what to do, (c) be in the right climate to facilitate the change, and (d) be rewarded for changing.
Since this study observed measureable changes in pilot behaviors, it can be assumed the online
training program influenced the learners at least to some degree along these criteria. Further, in
light of the results, these methods deserve consideration from aviation organizations –
particularly the paradigm of using observational data from recorded simulator events in making
data-driven decisions regarding on the utility of their training programs.
Recommendations
This research supports the use of low-cost, online training to advance the training of nontechnical skills such as pilot monitoring. The elements of this online training considered to be
the most effective include the self-paced nature of the training, allowing participants an
opportunity to practice what they learned, and the use of SME input in its development. Along
these lines, future studies are warranted to dissect which aspects of online training was most
beneficial to the learners. For example, was it the flexibility to take the training at a convenient
time that made the 5-2-1 rule so agreeable to the learners or was it the opportunity to practice the
rule in some actual scenarios? From the perspective of the need to train pilots to be more active
monitors, more research is needed into the usefulness for a memory aid like the 5-2-1 rule. This
rule was devised for training, but did not generate any feedback whether pilots or organizations
would accept a rule like this in the long-term. A survey study could be very useful here, but the
more important finding would be to conduct more field research to determine if applying a 5-2-1
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does produce some bottom-line performance improvements at vertical flight tasks, i.e., “results,”
per Kirkpatrick’s typology – the types of results we did not see here but assumed some level of a
ceiling effect from the significance of the training event to the participant.
Getting back to the impetus for this research, the results here do suggest we should apply
some of the general monitoring concepts and training design criteria used for this study back to
fixed-wing aircraft and the realm of commercial aviation. The resources within commercial
aviation for exploratory studies using flight simulators would advance our understanding of what
monitoring strategies to train and how to train them. As monitoring research continues to
mature, there would hopefully be discussions of the critical role of the monitoring pilot into the
CRM training as well. Given the fact that many aviation multi-crew fatal accidents occur in part
due to the pilots’ shortcomings in monitoring responsibilities, this is certainly a training domain
that is increasingly relevant to safer aviation operations.
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Appendix A: Informed Consent
Informed Consent Form
Purpose of Research
The purpose of this project is to determine effects of training on aircrew monitoring and cross-checking performance.
Specific Procedures
There are two possible training conditions, each of which will expose you to a training activity. You will be assigned to only one
of the conditions through a random process. In either condition, you will begin by completing a short training activity.
Responses/feedback in this section are not recorded or graded. You will then be asked to answer 10 questions about
monitoring and cross-checking. In the final section of the training, you will answer a short set of questions regarding your
feelings toward the training and give your opinions on certain flying techniques and cross-checking responsibilities. The total
duration of the session will be 20-30 minutes, depending on the condition.
Regardless of the condition you are assigned, you will next participate in the P-course simulator training session. This research
will not modify the P-course simulator training curriculum in any way. If you consent, ATC will allow us access to your simulator
data to analyze for effects of the two training conditions.
Benefits to the Individual
Following the data collection period, a researcher will contact you and provide you with a debriefing. It is possible for you to
gain a deeper understanding of aircrew monitoring and cross-checking behaviors.
Risks to Participants
While the materials in the training conditions may change your behavior during the simulator training session, it is unlikely that
the training conditions will impact your in-flight simulator performance.
Confidentiality
Your privacy will be protected. Your name will not be associated with neither the answers you provide in the training nor with
simulator data. A code number will be used to identify the data, and this code number will not be associated with your name
in any documentation upon completion of the study.
Voluntary Participation
You do not have to participate in this research project. If you do agree to participate, you can withdraw participation at any
time without penalty.
Human Subject Statement
If you have any questions about this research project, contact Brian Potter at (386) 402-8762. If there are concerns about the
treatment of the participants, contact Dr. Albert Boquet at the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Institutional Review Board
at (386) 226-7035. The email address is boque007@my.erau.edu.

I HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO READ THIS CONSENT FORM AND AM PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN
THIS PROJECT.
_____________________
Participant’s Signature
_______________________
Participant’s Name
_______________________
Researcher’s Signature

_____________
Date
_______________
Date
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Appendix B: Demographic Questionnaire
Demographics questionnaire*
1
What is your age?
2
What is your pilot designation?
3
How many total flight hours do you have (all aircraft)?
4
How many flight hours do you have in the HH-65?
5
How many CG flight hours do you have in the past 60 days?
6
What is your gender?
*Demographics collected using www.surveygizmo.com
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Appendix C: Monitoring and Cross-checking Online Training
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Appendix D: Post-training Test
1

As safety pilot on an IFR flight, how many times during the last 500 feet of a climb or descent should you
make altitude callouts to the flying pilot?
Score from 0 - 5

2

A rule-of-thumb for monitoring/cross-checking is:
( ) The PAC would make altitude callouts at 500 and 200 feet prior to any level off in altitude.
( ) The SP would make altitude callouts at 200 and 100 feet prior to any level off in altitude.
( ) Either crew member would make callouts 5, 2, and 1 seconds prior to completion of any timed maneuver.
( ) Either crew member would make altitude callouts at 500 and 100 feet prior to any altitude level off.

3

Most airline SOPs now recommend that both pilots should focus on ensuring the aircraft levels at the
assigned altitude during the last ____ feet of altitude change.
( ) 300
( ) 500
( ) 1000
( ) 1500
( ) 2000

4

As safety pilot on an IFR flight, how many times during the last 300 feet of an assigned climb should you
make altitude callouts to the flying pilot before reaching your target altitude?
Answer = 0-3

5

According to accident data, the most prominent cause of the crew committing a monitoring error during
an approach is:
( ) Distraction ( ) Disorientation ( ) Multitasking ( ) Lack of crew coordination

6

Which of the following flight phases are considered "areas of vulnerability"? (check all that apply)
[ ] taxi-out
[ ] taxi-in
[ ] descent
[ ] within 1,000 feet of level off
[ ] within 30 of rollout on heading
[ ] approach and landing
[ ] during an airspeed adjustment

7

Which of the following is a function of SP monitoring?
( ) A - Keep crew apprised of the status of aircraft, automation, and flight path.
( ) B - Help crew catch errors
( ) C - Helps detect evolving aspects of flight situation
( ) All of the above are correct

8

The term "areas of vulnerability" would be useful for... (Choose best two answers)
A. Selecting pilots to fly on a high risk flight
B. Choosing times not to conduct briefings, run checklists, etc.
C. Making a pre-flight risk assessment
D. Deciding which flight phases carry the highest risk of making an error.
()A&D
()B&C
()B&D
()C&D

9

Which of the following is considered a monitoring error?
( ) A- During an approach, the SP forgets to make one of the standard calls at the missed approach point
( ) B- During level off, you fail to check and report the center instrument panel as "checked"
( ) C- Before landing, the SP fails to report the landing gear "down and locked"
( ) All of the above are correct

10

As safety pilot on an IFR flight, how many times during the last 150 feet of an approach should you make
altitude callouts to the flying pilot (prior to call made upon reaching decision height)?
Answer = 0-3

Note: Test was distributed using www.surveygizmo.com
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Appendix E: “Reactions” Questionnaire
1

Please indicate how much you either agree or disagree with the following three statements: *
(use scale from 1 [strongly disagree] to 5 [strongly agree])
a.
b.

c.

The course objectives were clear.
The course material was organized and presented in an effective manner.
The course effectively used practical applications to make the subject matter more relatable.

2

To what extent do you expect this training will make a difference in the way you do your job?
( ) 1 - No difference….. ( ) 5 - Tremendous difference

3

How would you rate your overall knowledge of monitoring before the training activity?
( ) 1 - Low … ( ) 5 – High

4

How would you rate your overall knowledge of monitoring after the training activity?
( ) 1 - Low …. ( ) 5 – High

5

How would you rate this training course overall?
( ) 1 – Poor….. ( ) 5— Excellent

Note: Questionnaire was distributed using www.surveygizmo.com
* Question 1 was not presented to the control group.
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Appendix F: Attitudes Questionnaire
1

When you are in the role of the safety pilot, how would you rate the importance of the following
duties? (score on scale from 1 = of no importance to 7 = extremely important)
_______Completing checklists
_______Radio communications
_______Operating the flight director (autopilot)
_______Monitoring the actions of the other pilot
_______Monitoring the status of aircraft systems
_______Monitoring the aircraft’s flight path
_______Conducting briefings

2

When the flight director (i.e., automation) is helping to "fly" the aircraft and I am not at the controls, I
am __________ to monitor the actions of the flying pilot. (Choose a score from 1-6)
1 = significantly less vigilant … 7 = significantly more vigilant

3

Assume you are out flying in actual instrument conditions. If you are the safety pilot, how would you
rate the importance of monitoring each of the following instruments/indications? (score on scale from
1 = of no importance to 7 = extremely important)
[ ] Barometric Altimeter
[ ] Heading
[ ] VSI (Vertical Speed Indicator)

4

[ ]Airspeed Indicator
[ ] ADI (Attitude Direction Indicator)

When you are the safety pilot, how would you rate the importance of "monitoring" (i.e., observing
flying pilot's actions, instrument scanning, & system status) during the following flight regimes: (score
on scale from 1 = of no importance to 7 = extremely important)
[ ] Pre-takeoff/taxi
[ ] Approach to landing
[ ] Hover operations

5

[ ] Radio Altimeter
[ ] FMS Modes

[ ] Takeoff
[ ] Approach to overwater hover

[ ] Enroute to destination/op area
[ ] Landing

Both pilots should be monitoring the aircraft's altitude and not be involved in other tasks (radio calls,
checklists, etc.), during the last x feet of any climb or descent to ensure the aircraft levels off at the
appropriate altitude. In regards to the variable "X", I feel that...
[ ] X (number) of feet is an appropriate guideline (X should be ____)
[ ] More guidelines are needed. Exact number for "X" should vary proportionally to aircraft altitude (e.g.,
100 feet prior during low level maneuvers, 500 feet prior during enroute flying, etc.)
[ ] More guidelines are needed. Exact number for "X" should vary based on flight regime (IFR, VFR,
overwater, pattern ops, etc.)
[ ] No guideline needed. The existing rules for altitude callouts that are in place are fine, and leaving
decisions how to allocate other safety pilot responsibilities to the discretion of the crew is ok.

Note: Questionnaire was distributed using www.surveygizmo.com.
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Appendix G: Participant Debriefing
Participant Debriefing script
Thank you for participating in this research project. Your participation will assist in
understanding the effectiveness of using online and computer-based methods to train nontechnical skills such as monitoring and cross-checking to pilots. Instances of non-flying pilots
failing to keep track of the flying pilot’s actions and aircraft’s trajectory are increasingly
common in aviation accidents; however, there is little effort at this time to specifically train
pilots the skills or strategies to catch these types of errors. In some ways, these types of skills are
related to those trained during CRM training, but need to be explored before this relationship and
training needs are fully understood.
For this study, the researchers were primarily interested in the effectiveness of an interactive,
online monitoring training activity. Half of the participants received this online training and half
did not. In order to measure its effectiveness, we looked at several different potential outcomes.
Specifically, the researchers had you answer a group of test questions, and give us your reactions
and opinions of the training. Then, using recordings of your simulator flights while at ATC
Mobile, we also observed and measured aspects of pilot-to-pilot communications, with particular
attention to the vertical phases of flight.
It will take up to three months to complete this study and publish the results. It is requested that
you not discuss your experiences in this session until after the results are published. Please
contact the researcher if you would like to receive a summary of the results; we just ask you be
patient.
If you have any questions, please let the researcher (Brian) know at brian.a.potter@uscg.mil or
you can contact the Human Factors and Systems department of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University. Results of this study will be published and placed in the Hunt Library (Daytona
Beach Campus) upon completion of this project.
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Appendix H: Sample Rater Grade Sheet – IFR scenario #1
1 (2000 ft)

3 (4000 ft)

2 (250 ft)

IFR#1

Time: _____

5 (2000 ft)

4 (480 ft)

7 (2000 ft)

6 (460 ft)

Pilot IDs: ____

1. Start time ______
End time ______ SP Callouts ___
Ttl Secs ______

500
200
100

2. Start time ______
End time ______ SP Callouts ___
Ttl Secs ______

500
200
100

Total: ___ (0-3)

3. Start time ______
End time ______ SP Callouts ___
Ttl Secs ______

500
200
100

Total: ___ (0-3)

4. Start time ______
End time ______ SP Callouts ___
Ttl Secs ______

500
200
100

Total: ___ (0-3)

5. Start time ______
End time ______ SP Callouts ___
Ttl Secs ______

500
200
100

Total: ___ (0-3)

6. Start time ______
End time ______ SP Callouts ___
Ttl Secs ______

500
200
100

Total: ___ (0-3)

7. Start time ______
End time ______ SP Callouts ___
Ttl Secs ______

500
200
100

Total: ___ (0-3)

8. Start time ______
End time ______ SP Callouts ___
Ttl Secs ______

500
200
100

Total: ___ (0-3)

Total: ___ (0-3)

8 (270 ft)

Trained/Untrained
Overshoot ____ or N/A
Success? Y/N
Overshoot ____ or N/A
Success? Y/N
Overshoot ____ or N/A
Success? Y/N
Overshoot ____ or N/A
Success? Y/N
Overshoot ____ or N/A
Success? Y/N
Overshoot ____ or N/A
Success? Y/N
Overshoot ____ or N/A
Success? Y/N
Overshoot ____ or N/A
Success? Y/N

Enter total Callouts here ____

Total 5-2-1 = _____

Ttl Overshoot = ____

Divide by Grand total secs _____

Divide by 24 = ____

Divide by 8 = _____

=______*60 = callouts per minute: _______

